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FOREWORD
Good corporate governance is central to sustaining the growth of Asia and the Pacific and to the 
poverty reduction mandate of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It is key to a well-functioning 
finance sector, in particular the capital market. Recognizing its importance, significant time, 
money, and effort have been put into promoting good corporate governance. Despite this, we 
see weaknesses and failures in adopting and sustaining good corporate governance everyday; 
some of which have resulted in disruptions detrimental to the global economy, as we have 
seen in the recent past. Clearly, our efforts to promote good corporate governance and sound 
financial markets must move beyond national boundaries. While national governments develop 
corporate governance frameworks through national blueprints and strategies, these actions 
require complimentary coordination at the regional level for the region to be branded as an asset 
class based on corporate governance. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), aspiring to and understanding the need for such cooperation on a more macro level, 
have encapsulated this agenda in the grand vision of the ASEAN Economic Community, which 
includes regional capital market integration. 
ADB’s development agenda accords regional integration the same importance. ADB’s Long-Term 
Strategic Framework (Strategy 2020) includes regional integration as one of its three critical 
strategic agendas. This is because we believe that regional integration not only provides countries 
with the ability to respond more effectively to unexpected changes in economic circumstances, 
but also helps raise productivity, accelerate economic growth, and reduce economic disparity. 
Similarly, ADB’s Financial Sector Operational Plan identifies financial cooperation and integration 
as a specific focus area. The plan includes the promotion of common standards for financial 
transactions and the establishment of financial infrastructure that supports cross-border 
transactions.
ADB has been supporting ASEAN regional capital market integration since 2005 through a 
series of regional technical assistance projects. The outcome of freer flow of funds through 
cross-border investments promotes economic growth in ASEAN, and countries also benefit 
from the process of integration, such as having the opportunity to exchange information and 
adopt international best practices, upgrading standards through harmonization, and building 
trust in the region. In this regard, we are honored to have been involved in the endorsement of 
the Implementation Plan for Regional Integration of Capital Markets in ASEAN (implementation 
plan) by the ASEAN Finance Ministers in 2009, which provides a comprehensive approach for 
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building an integrated regional capital market. The latest ADB technical assistance approved in 
2010 continues to support the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF) in implementing specific 
initiatives and milestones of the implementation plan. 
The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (Scorecard) is a landmark joint initiative between 
the ACMF and ADB that started with the development of the methodology that underpins the 
Scorecard, culminating in the publication of country reports and assessments that you now have 
in your hands. This would not have been possible without the effort and hard work of ACMF 
members—national regulators with a vision for the region. I would like to take this opportunity 
to congratulate and thank all parties, especially members of the working group led by Securities 
Commission Malaysia that has brought this initiative to this concrete and meaningful output. 
Without doubt, there is more work ahead of us; improving corporate governance standards in 
the region is not a sprint but a marathon. It is ADB’s sincere hope and wish that the ASEAN 
Corporate Governance Taskforce that has now been entrusted to take this initiative forward will 
keep this momentum going and collectively bring the regional corporate governance standards 
and practices to greater heights.
Shigeko Hattori
Director
Public Management, Financial Sector, and Trade Division
Southeast Asia Department
Asian Development Bank
1 INTRODUCTION
The corporate governance initiative of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
is one of several regional capital market integration initiatives of the ASEAN Capital Markets 
Forum (ACMF). It is led by the Securities Commission Malaysia and is supported by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) through its regional technical assistance (TA). ADB has supported 
ASEAN regional capital market integration through a series of regional TA projects since 2005, 
and has supported this initiative through the regional TA “Promoting an Interlinked ASEAN 
Capital Market” since 2011. 
The initiative’s objectives are:
•	 to raise the corporate governance standards and practices of ASEAN publicly listed 
companies (PLCs),
•	 to give greater international visibility to well-governed ASEAN PLCs and showcase them 
as investable companies, and
•	 to complement other ACMF initiatives and promote ASEAN as an asset class.
Six ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam—agreed to participate in this initiative. Subsequently, six international corporate 
governance experts, one from each participating country, were engaged to develop the Scorecard 
on the basis of their national experience, validate it against international best practices, and 
finally implement it by assessing the PLCs in their respective countries.
The next section of this report traces the process and the thinking that went into the 
development of the Scorecard. The section after that contains the country reports and the 
assessment of the PLCs in the six participating countries. The assessment covers the five 
areas of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles 
of corporate governance: (i) rights of shareholders, (ii) equitable treatment of shareholders, 
(iii) role of stakeholders, (iv) disclosure and transparency, and (v) responsibilities of the board. 
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Each country report concludes by recommending steps that PLCs and capital market regulators 
can take to improve corporate governance standards in the country, and provides a summary 
of the assessment results for the PLCs in the country, arranged in alphabetical order (Tables 1, 
3, 4, 6, 7, and 8).
The publication ends with concluding remarks and recommendations based on the experience 
gained in implementing the initiative since 2011.
3In 2009, finance ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) endorsed 
the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF) Implementation Plan for the development of an 
integrated capital market. This initiative is being undertaken in parallel with efforts to achieve 
convergence in ASEAN as an economic community by 2015. Broadly speaking, the ACMF 
Implementation Plan seeks to achieve the objectives of the ASEAN Economic Community by 
•	 creating an enabling environment for regional integration;
•	 creating market infrastructure and regionally focused products and intermediaries;
•	 strengthening implementation; and
•	 improving the visibility, integrity, and branding of ASEAN as an asset class. 
The ACMF Corporate Governance Initiative
The ASEAN corporate governance initiative, comprising the ASEAN Corporate Governance 
Scorecard and the ranking of corporate governance of ASEAN publicly listed companies (PLCs), 
is among several regional initiatives of the ACMF. Since it started in early 2011, the initiative 
has been supported by ADB through the technical assistance (TA) for Promoting an Interlinked 
ASEAN Capital Market.
The ACMF Working Group D is responsible for this initiative. The working group is led by 
the Securities Commission Malaysia and its members include capital market regulators and 
corporate governance proponents from the region. Working Group D has been working to 
enhance a corporate governance ranking methodology, leveraging methodologies already 
implemented in ASEAN countries, as well as those applied by multilateral agencies such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). From the components 
and methodologies gathered, assessment criteria and a corporate governance template in the 
form of a scorecard have been developed. 
To keep the methodology objective and independent, the ACMF has enlisted corporate 
governance experts in the region to develop the Scorecard and the assessment criteria. The 
experts for the initiative were chosen for their experience in corporate governance-ranking 
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initiatives in their own countries and the recognition accorded to them as authorities in the 
area of corporate governance. They were recommended by the capital market regulators in the 
individual countries. The experts, approved by the ACMF, have no vested interest in PLCs and 
are not linked to securities regulators.
The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard was created by the following corporate governance 
experts:
•	 Mak Yuen Teen, Former Co-director of the Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting 
Centre and Associate Professor of Accounting, National University of Singapore;
•	 Rongruja Saicheua, Executive Vice President, Thai Institute of Directors;
•	 Salleh Hassan, Director, Securities Industry Development Corporation, Malaysia;
•	 Sidharta Utama, Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia;
•	 Jesus Estanislao, Chair, Institute of Corporate Directors, Philippines; and
•	 Hien Thu Nguyen, PhD, Vice Dean, Finance Department, School of Industrial Management, 
University of Technology, Vietnam National University of Ho Chi Minh City.
The following bodies in each country have been appointed as domestic ranking bodies to work 
with the experts in applying the Scorecard to rank companies in each country:
•	 Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship;
•	 Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group in Malaysia;
•	 Institute of Corporate Directors in the Philippines; and 
•	 Thai Institute of Directors.
In countries where a similar body has not been appointed, the use of the Scorecard may be 
granted to specific persons authorized by the ACMF. The use of the Scorecard by any other 
party requires authorization and permission from the ACMF.
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Principles behind the ASEAN Corporate 
Governance Scorecard
The development of the Scorecard was guided by the following principles:
•	 The Scorecard should reflect global principles and internationally recognized good 
practices in corporate governance applicable to PLCs and, in some instances, may 
exceed the requirement and standards recommended in national legislation.
•	 The Scorecard should not be based on the lowest common denominator, but should aim 
to encourage PLCs to adopt higher standards and aspirations.
•	 The Scorecard should be comprehensive in coverage, capturing the salient elements of 
corporate governance. 
•	 The Scorecard should enable gaps in corporate governance practices among ASEAN 
PLCs to be identified and should draw attention to good corporate governance practices.
•	 The Scorecard should be universal and applicable to different markets in ASEAN.
•	 The methodology should be robust to allow the accurate assessment of the corporate 
governance of PLCs beyond minimum compliance and box ticking.
•	 There should be extensive and robust quality assurance processes to ensure the 
independence and reliability of the assessment.
Initial Development
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, given their global acceptance by policy makers, 
investors, and other stakeholders, were used as the main benchmark for the Scorecard. 
Consequently, many of the items in the Scorecard may be best practices that go beyond the 
requirements of national legislation.
The experts also drew from the existing body of work and ranking initiatives in the region, 
including those of institutes of directors, shareholder associations, and universities, to guide the 
initial inclusion of items in the Scorecard.
The Scorecard covers the following five areas of the OECD principles:
•	 rights of shareholders; 
•	 equitable treatment of shareholders; 
•	 role of stakeholders; 
•	 disclosure and transparency; and 
•	 responsibilities of the board.
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The weight allocated to each of the five areas is as follows:
•	 Rights of shareholders 10%
•	 Equitable treatment of shareholders 15%
•	 Role of stakeholders 10%
•	 Disclosure and transparency 25%
•	 Responsibilities of the board 40%
Total weight 100%
The use of two levels of scoring is designed to better capture the implementation of the substance 
of good corporate governance (Box). Level 1 comprises descriptors or items that are in essence 
indicative of (i) the laws, rules, regulations, and requirements of each ASEAN member; and 
(ii) basic expectations of the OECD principles. Level 2 consists of (i) bonus items reflecting other 
emerging good practices, and (ii) penalty items reflecting actions and events that are indicative 
of poor governance.
Box The Two Levels of the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard
Level 1
Five major sections that correspond to the
OECD Principles:
Part A: Rights of Shareholders (26 items)
Part B: Equitable Treatment (17 items)
Part C: Role of Stakeholders (21 items)
Part D: Disclosure and Transparency (42 items)
Part E: Responsibilities of the Board (79 items)
Total number of items or descriptors: 185 items
Level 2
Two additional sections:
Bonus and Penalty
Bonus items for companies that go beyond
minimum standards (11 items)
Penalty items for companies with
poor practices (23 items)
Total bonus and
penalty items (34 items)
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Refinement and Validation
The Scorecard was reviewed item by item against the OECD principles; other international 
corporate governance principles and practices recommended by bodies such as the World 
Bank, the International Corporate Governance Network, and the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association; and selected codes of corporate governance. Each item in the Scorecard was 
cross-referenced to at least one of these benchmarks.
The Scorecard was put through a validation process (beta testing). It was applied to a sample 
of companies in each country to ensure that the wording of the items on the Scorecard was 
widely comprehensible and universally applicable. The validation process also sought to identify 
the sources of information for the Scorecard items and any laws, regulations, and listing rules 
applicable to each item in each country. The Scorecard was also subjected to peer review to 
minimize discrepancies in the standards of assessment applied by the experts. 
The corporate governance experts met with a senior representative from the OECD in 
August 2011, and this engagement resulted in the endorsement of the Scorecard and the 
methodology by the OECD. The second round of engagement was held with the OECD and the 
International Corporate Governance Network in July 2012, when senior representatives from 
both organizations provided constructive feedback to strengthen the Scorecard.
Development of Detailed Guidance for Assessors
To ensure the consistent application of the Scorecard by all assessors, in this and future 
assessments, detailed guidance notes have been developed for individual items, especially 
where the item is not self-explanatory.
Guidance for Publicly Listed Companies and 
Stakeholders on the Use of the Scorecard
PLCs and stakeholders using the scorecard and its results should note the following points:
Accessibility of Information
The assessment of PLCs through the Scorecard relies primarily on information contained 
from annual reports and company websites. Other sources of information are company 
announcements, circulars, articles of association, minutes of shareholders’ meetings, corporate 
governance policies, codes of conduct, and sustainability reports. Only information that is 
publicly available and easily accessible and understood is used in the assessment. To be given 
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points on the Scorecard, disclosure must be unambiguous and sufficiently complete. To be 
assessed, most of this information should be in English.
Scorecard Methodology 
Level 1
Level 1 consists of 185 items and is divided into five parts corresponding to the OECD principles. 
Each part carries a different weight based on the relative importance of the area.
Each item in level 1 carries one point. Some items may also provide for a “not applicable” 
option. Where a practice is mandated by laws, regulations, or listing rules in a country, the 
company is assumed to have adopted the practice unless there is evidence to the contrary. 
To be awarded points, the company must make sufficiently clear and complete disclosure.
The overall score in each part of level 1 is then computed by adding all the points in that part, 
adjusting for items that are not applicable to the company. The total score for a company is 
computed by weighting the scores for each part according to relative importance and totaling 
the weighted scores.
Level 2
Level 2 contains 34 bonus and penalty items collectively, each with a different number of 
points. The purpose of the bonus items is to recognize companies that go beyond the items in 
level 1 by adopting other emerging good practices. The penalty items are designed to downgrade 
companies with poor governance practices that are not reflected in their scores for level 1, 
such as being sanctioned by regulators for breaches of listing rules. The bonus and penalty 
items are meant to enhance the robustness of the Scorecard in assessing the extent to which 
companies apply the spirit of good corporate governance. 
The total bonus and penalty points are added to or subtracted from the total score in level 1 to 
give the final score for the company.
Desired Outcomes
The Scorecard and the assessment are intended to raise corporate governance standards and 
practices of ASEAN PLCs, and to showcase well-governed ASEAN PLCs and make them more 
visible and investable to global investors, thereby improving their liquidity and valuation. ASEAN 
PLCs are encouraged to use the Scorecard as a tool in their ongoing journey to improve their 
corporate governance practices.
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The Scorecard and its results can also be used by regulators as a reference in reviewing 
corporate governance rules and guidelines in order to enhance corporate governance practices 
among PLCs. It is also hoped that the Scorecard will facilitate convergence in methodologies for 
assessing the corporate governance of PLCs.
Future Refinement of the Scorecard and the Methodology
The Scorecard and the methodology will be reviewed periodically and, if necessary, revised to 
reflect new developments in corporate governance.
Caveats
As with any corporate governance assessment based on publicly available information, there 
are inherent limitations in the Scorecard and the domestic assessments of PLCs. First, as the 
methodology relies on public information, only corporate governance policies and practices that 
are publicly disclosed are captured in the assessment. 
Second, PLCs that disclose certain corporate governance practices may not be applying those 
practices or may be applying them only in form rather than in substance. While penalty items 
are used to downgrade companies that demonstrate poor corporate governance practices, these 
are applied only where there is clear evidence of such practices.
Third, although there are items dealing with the conduct of directors, management, and 
employees of companies, the Scorecard is not specifically designed to assess the ethical 
behavior of those responsible for the stewardship of the companies. 
Fourth, although good corporate governance should improve the long-term value of PLCs, no 
assertion is made about links between the corporate governance assessments of the PLCs with 
their financial performance.
 COUNTRY REPORTS 
AND ASSESSMENTS3
11
INDONESIA
Corporate Governance Framework
The Indonesian law on limited-liability companies (Undang-Undang No. 40 2007 Perseroan 
Terbatas) provides the legal framework for the governance of corporations, including publicly 
listed companies (PLCs). In addition, PLCs must comply with the listing rules of the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange and the capital market and financial institutions supervisory body (BAPEPAM-
LK). PLCs in banking have to comply with governance standards set by the central bank and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) must comply with those set by the Ministry of SOEs.
PLCs may voluntarily adopt, fully or partially, the General Guidance on Good Corporate 
Governance developed by the National Committee on Governance Policy in 2001. The 
guidance was revised in 2006 and is considered to be the national corporate governance code 
for Indonesia.
Overall Results and Analysis
The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship assessed the country’s 100 largest PLCs 
based on market capitalization as of 30 June 2012. Three PLCs that could not provide annual 
reports in English were dropped. 
The average total corporate governance score is 43.4%; the maximum score is 75.4% and the 
minimum score is 20.8%. The relatively low average score indicates that the majority of the 
PLCs in Indonesia do not yet practice internationally based corporate governance principles. 
There are several reasons for the low score:
•	 The majority of the corporate governance practices covered in the ASEAN Corporate 
Governance Scorecard are voluntary, while Indonesian PLCs tend to practice only items 
that are mandated. Since there is no “comply or explain” requirement in the national 
corporate governance code, some PLCs may not refer at all to the code and thus are not 
aware of corporate governance practices that can be voluntarily adopted.
•	 Some corporate governance practices are mandated but not all PLCs follow the 
requirements.1 Thus, PLCs need to improve their compliance with the rules.
1 For example, BAPEPAM-LK requires PLCs to disclose the attendance of board members in board meetings. However, 
a large number of PLCs fail to do so.
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A further analysis of the results reveals that the average corporate governance scores of banks 
(58.9) and SOEs (62.2), are significantly higher than the scores for nonbanks (40.5) and private 
companies (39.9). Banks and SOEs are closely supervised by the Central Bank and the Ministry 
of SOEs, in addition to BAPEPAM-LK. Thus, monitoring by regulators plays a crucial role in 
enhancing corporate governance practice in Indonesia. 
Part A: Rights of Shareholders  
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The principle stipulates that companies should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ 
rights. These rights include the right to participate in and be sufficiently informed on decisions 
concerning fundamental corporate changes and the right to participate effectively and vote in 
general shareholders’ meetings. 
The average score in this category is the lowest relative to the average scores in other categories, 
with a maximum score of only 46.1 and a minimum score of 23.1. The scores are low mainly 
because it is uncommon for PLCs in Indonesia to publish the minutes of the annual general 
meetings (AGMs), which provide valuable information for investors to evaluate the process and 
substance of the meeting. In addition, most PLCs announce the results of the AGM more than 
1 day after the date of the meeting and do not disclose the existence of a policy that allows 
shareholders to elect directors and commissioners individually. Most PLCs also pay dividends 
more than 30 days after they are declared.
One strength of Indonesia in the Rights of Shareholders category is the requirement in the 
company law to have the remuneration of board members approved by shareholders at the 
AGM. Fundamental corporate changes must also be approved by shareholders.
Figure 1 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Rights of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Shareholder approval of remuneration of board members
•	 Shareholder approval of fundamental corporate changes
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Lack of published minutes of annual general meetings
•	 Publication of annual general meeting results more than 1 day after the meeting
•	 Payment of dividends more than 30 days after declaration
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Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
According to the principle, companies must ensure equitable treatment of shareholders, 
including noncontrolling and foreign shareholders. In addition, shareholders should be able 
to obtain effective redress for violations of their rights. Under this principle, insider trading 
and abusive related-party transactions (RPTs) should be prohibited and procedures for AGMs 
should ensure equitable treatment of shareholders. 
The average score for this category is also low, with a maximum score of 68.8 and a minimum 
score of 6.3. Some factors that explain the low score are as follows:
•	 AGM notices, which provide information for shareholders and investors on the agenda 
of the meeting, are rarely in English.
•	 Supplementary information that elaborates the agenda of the AGM is not provided or 
is not easily accessible. This information includes profiles of board candidates, the 
possible appointment or reappointment of auditors, dividend policy, and the target date 
of the dividend payment.
•	 Most companies do not have or do not disclose the existence of a policy requiring 
board members to report their dealings in company shares within 3 business days after 
the transaction. 
•	 Most companies do not have or do not disclose the existence of a policy requiring an 
independent committee to review material RPTs to determine if they are in the best 
interest of the company.
The strengths of Indonesian PLCs in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders are: 
•	 The company law requires board members (directors and commissioners) to abstain 
from participating in board discussions on a particular agenda where they have a conflict 
of interest. 
•	 Only a few RPTs can be classified as financial assistance by PLCs to entities other than 
wholly owned subsidiary companies. 
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Part C: Role of Stakeholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
According to the principle, companies must respect the rights of stakeholders and encourage 
cooperation between companies and stakeholders in creating wealth and promoting the 
companies’ long-term sustainability. Companies are expected to establish policies and programs 
that recognize stakeholders’ rights and provide opportunities for them to obtain effective redress 
for violations of their rights. The average score for this category is 52.2, with a maximum score 
of 100 and a minimum score of 4.8. Relative to other categories, the Role of Stakeholders has 
the largest divergence of scores across companies: some companies extensively disclose their 
stakeholder policies and programs, while others barely disclose their corporate responsibility in 
annual reports and on company websites. This finding is quite intriguing, given that both the 
company law and BAPEPAM-LK mandate companies to disclose their corporate responsibility 
in annual reports. 
Some corporate responsibilities that are widely practiced by PLCs are: 
•	 policy and activities related to interaction with communities; 
•	 policy on the health, safety, and welfare of employees; 
•	 policy on training and development programs for employees; and 
•	 the inclusion of a separate section on corporate responsibility in the annual report. 
Figure 2 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Abstention of board members from decisions on matters where they have a 
conflict of interest
•	 Infrequency of financial assistance to entities other than wholly owned 
subsidiaries
AreAS for Improvement
•	 General unavailability of annual general meeting notices in English
•	 General noninclusion of required supplementary information in annual general 
meeting notices
•	 Lack of timely reporting of trading by insiders in company shares
•	 Lack of a policy requiring an independent committee to review material 
related-party transactions
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On the other hand, the following corporate responsibilities are not yet commonly practiced: 
•	 policy and activities on supplier selection, 
•	 anticorruption policy and activities, and 
•	 whistle-blowing mechanism. 
Figure 3 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Role of Stakeholders
StrengthS
•	 Social responsibility policy and programs
•	 Policy on health, safety, and welfare of employees
•	 Policy on training and development programs for employees
•	 Separate section on corporate responsibility in annual report
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Inadequate supplier selection policy and programs
•	 Lack of anticorruption policy and activities
•	 General lack of whistle-blowing mechanism
Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
This category stipulates that companies must disclose accurately and on time all material 
information regarding the companies, including the financial condition, ownership structure, 
RPTs, and governance of the company. Financial statements should be audited by independent 
and competent external auditors, and channels of communication should provide equal, 
timely, and cost-efficient access to relevant information for stakeholders. The average score for 
Disclosure and Transparency is 53.7, with a maximum score of 85.0 and a minimum score 
of 19.5. The average score is the highest relative to the scores in other categories because 
some disclosure practices are mandated by BAPEPAM-LK or the listing rule. The mandated 
disclosure covers, among others, financial performance indicators and RPTs (name of related 
parties, nature and value of RPTs); quarterly financial reports; and audited financial statements. 
The audited financial statements should be published within 90 days after the close of the 
financial year. Even though not required to do so, some companies publish downloadable 
financial statements and annual reports, as well as reports on business operations, on their 
company websites.
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The following are some areas for improvement in Disclosure and Transparency: 
•	 PLCs disclose only direct ownership of company shares by substantial shareholders, 
board members, and key executives. They fail to disclose indirect ownership by these 
parties. 
•	 Because PLCs are not required to disclose their compliance with the corporate governance 
code, very few make this disclosure in their annual reports. 
•	 While PLCs disclose the profiles of board members, many of them do not disclose the 
board members’ directorships in other listed companies.
•	 Most PLCs also do not disclose the audit and non-audit fees of their audit firms.
•	 Finally, although mandated to do so by BAPEPAM-LK, the majority of Indonesian PLCs 
do not provide information about the remuneration of board members. This is probably 
because the information is considered too sensitive to be disclosed publicly.
Figure 4 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Disclosure and Transparency 
StrengthS
•	 Disclosure of financial performance indicators
•	 Disclosure of names of related parties, and the nature and value of  
related-party transactions
•	 Publication of quarterly financial reports and audited financial statements 
within 90 days after the end of the financial year
•	 Publication of downloadable financial statements and annual reports, 
as well as reports on business operations, on company websites
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Failure to disclose indirect ownership by insiders
•	 Lack of disclosure in annual reports of the extent of the company’s compliance 
with the corporate governance code
•	 Failure to disclose board members’ directorships in other listed companies
•	 Failure to disclose audit fees and non-audit fees
•	 Inadequacy of information provided on the remuneration of each member of 
the board
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Part E: Responsibility of the Board 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
According to this principle, the board of commissioners (BOC) should effectively monitor 
management, provide strategic guidance to the company, and be accountable to the company 
and its shareholders. The board should treat all shareholders fairly, apply high ethical standards, 
and take the interests of stakeholders into account in all board decisions. It should exercise 
objective and independent judgment in corporate affairs, and its members should be committed 
to fulfilling their responsibilities and have access to accurate, timely, and relevant information. 
The average score in this category is 44.1, with a minimum score of 19.2 and a maximum 
score of 77.2.
Some good practices in this regard among Indonesian PLCs are as follows: 
•	 In most PLCs, there is at least one commissioner with prior work experience in the major 
industry in which the company is operating. 
•	 The members of the audit committee are entirely independent. 
•	 Disclosure of audit committee tasks, composition, number of meetings, and attendance 
is common.
•	 Internal control procedures and risk management systems are in place and adequately 
disclosed.
Some factors contributing to the low score are: 
•	 lack of disclosure of the nomination process for board members, including key executives; 
•	 inadequate disclosure of the performance appraisal of the board, its committees, and 
the members of the board;
•	 lack of rules on the term limit of independent commissioners, as well as the limit on the 
number of board seats in PLCs that a commissioner may hold at the same time; and 
•	 further, some PLCs do not disclose the frequency of BOC meetings and the attendance 
of each member of the BOC, even though disclosure is mandated by BAPEPAM-LK.
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Bonus and Penalty
The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard awards bonus points to companies that practice 
corporate governance beyond minimum standards, and deducts penalty points for companies 
that have poor corporate governance practices or that violate prevailing rules or laws. Most 
companies do not earn bonus or penalty points. Few companies earn bonus points for having 
the BOC or audit committee comment on the adequacy of the company’s internal controls and 
risk management system. In the Penalty category, about one-third of Indonesian PLCs have a 
pyramid capital structure, although this type of ownership structure increases the risk of wealth 
expropriation from noncontrolling shareholders. Further, almost 20% of Indonesian PLCs fail 
to disclose the appointment dates of independent commissioners and almost 30% of PLCs 
have independent commissioners who have served more than 9 years. Serving too long as an 
independent commissioner raises concerns about the ability of the commissioner to maintain 
his or her independent judgment.
Figure 5 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Responsibility of the Board
StrengthS
•	 Inclusion of at least one commissioner with prior work experience in the 
major industry in which the company is operating
•	 Full independence of audit committee members
•	 Adequate disclosure of audit committee tasks, composition, number of 
meetings, and attendance
•	 Adequate disclosure of internal control procedures and risk management 
systems
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Lack of disclosure of the nomination process for board members, including 
key executives
•	 Lack of performance appraisal of the board, its committees, and members of 
the board
•	 Lack of rules on the term limit of independent commissioners, as well as 
the limit on the number of board seats in publicly listed companies that a 
commissioner may hold at the same time
•	 Failure to disclose the frequency of board of commissioners meetings and the 
rate of attendance of each member at the meetings
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
Overall, corporate governance practices in most PLCs in Indonesia need to be significantly 
improved to bring them in line with international best practices. The improvements have to 
be made in all corporate governance categories. To ensure the sustainability of financially 
sound enterprises, companies need to develop and implement corporate governance policies 
and enhance their compliance with prevailing rules and the code of corporate governance. 
In addition, the role of the regulator is crucial. Efforts to improve corporate governance should 
be the responsibility not only of the PLCs and the regulator, but also of other relevant parties, 
such as investors, creditors, and equity analysts.
The following are some key recommendations aimed at improving the corporate governance 
practices of PLCs in Indonesia:
•	 A gap analysis of existing regulations on corporate governance should be conducted to 
identify new corporate governance rules or existing rules that need to be revised. 
•	 Compliance with rules should be increased through stricter enforcement.
•	 The national code of corporate governance was last revised in 2006 and therefore 
needs to be updated to reflect the latest international best practices and fit them to the 
Indonesian context.
•	 After the code is revised and disseminated to the PLCs, the “comply or explain” rule 
should become mandatory for all PLCs.
•	 Controlling shareholders, board members, and key executives should be educated in the 
benefits of practicing good corporate governance and incorporating the practices in the 
business operations of companies.
•	 Public monitoring of corporate governance practices can be strengthened if investors, 
creditors, and other stakeholders are educated in the importance of practicing good 
corporate governance.
Figure 6 Strengths and Areas of Improvement in the Bonus and Penalty Area
StrengthS
•	 Comments by the board of commissioners or audit committees on the 
adequacy of the company’s internal controls and risk management system
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Prevalence of pyramid capital structure
•	 Failure to disclose the appointment dates of independent commissioners
•	 Over 9 years of service of independent commissioners in close to a third of 
publicly listed companies
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Table 1 Corporate Governance: Top 50 Publicly Listed Companies – Indonesia
No. Publicly Listed Company Name No. Publicly Listed Company Name
 1 ABM Investama 26 Indo Tambangraya Megah
 2 Adaro Energy 27 Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa
 3 AKR Corporindo 28 Indosat
 4 Astra Otoparts 29 Jasa Marga
 5 Bakrie Telecom 30 Kalbe Farma
 6 Bank BPD Jawabarat 31 Krakatau Steel
 7 Bank BTN 32 Lippo Karawaci
 8 Bank CIMB Niaga 33 Perusahaan Gas Negara
 9 Bank Danamon 34 Aneka Tambang
10 Bank Internasional Indonesia 35 Astra International
11 Bank Mandiri 36 Bank Central Asia
12 Bank Mega 37 Bank Permata
13 Bank Negara Indonesia 38 Dian Swastika
14 Bank OCBC NISP 39 Medco Energi International
15 Bank Panin 40 Telekomunikasi Indonesia
16 Bank Rakyat Indonesia 41 Timah
17 Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional 42 Vale Indonesia
18 Bayan Resources 43 Adira Dinamika Multi Finance
19 Bukit Asam 44 Salim Ivomas
20 Bumi Resources 45 Semen Gresik (Persero) 
21 BW Plantation 46 Summarecon
22 Energy Mega Persada 47 Unilever Indonesia
23 Garuda Indonesia 48 United Tractors
24 Harum Energy 49 Wijaya Karya
25 Indika Energy 50 XL Axiata
Note: The publicly listed companies are arranged alphabetically.
The Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship is determined to support the regulators in 
promoting a conducive regulatory atmosphere for good corporate governance practices and to 
help Indonesian PLCs internalize best corporate governance practices.
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MALAYSIA
Corporate Governance Framework
The 1997 Asian financial crisis led many Asian countries to reform their financial and corporate 
institutions. The event was a catalyst for the beginning of progressive and collaborative efforts, 
led by the government and regulators with close consultation with the industry, to promote 
sound corporate governance. Over the years, these efforts have resulted in a more coherent and 
consistent regulatory framework that now underpins Malaysian corporate governance. 
Table 2 below highlights some major laws and regulations that make up and influence the 
corporate governance framework and shape corporate governance practices in Malaysia. Various 
other measures have also been undertaken by regulators to enhance Malaysia’s corporate 
governance framework. These measures should lead to improvements in the economic value-
added of companies, higher productivity, and a lower risk of systemic financial failure.
Table 2 Major Laws and Regulations Affecting Corporate Governance in Malaysia
Companies Act of 1965 and amendments in 2007
Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1989
Development Financial Institutions Act of 2002
Financial Reporting Act of 1997 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
Securities Commission Act 1993 and amendments in 2011
Capital Markets and Services Act of 2007 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance of 2012 
In July 2011, the Securities Commission Malaysia launched the Corporate Governance 
Blueprint 2011. With the theme Towards Excellence in Corporate Governance, the blueprint 
provides a 5-year action plan for raising corporate governance standards in Malaysia by 
strengthening self-discipline and market discipline and promoting greater internalization of 
the culture of good governance. One of the key outputs of the blueprint, the new Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance, was released in March 2012, superseding its predecessor, 
which was released in 2007 (Figure 7). The code sets out broad principles and specific 
recommendations on structures and processes that companies should adopt in making good 
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corporate governance an integral part of their business dealings and culture. Publicly listed 
companies (PLCs) should explain how they have complied with the recommendations in the 
code; and those that have not complied with the recommendations should explain why.
The top 100 PLCs among those listed on Bursa Malaysia, ranked according to market 
capitalization at the end of June 2012, were identified for inclusion in the second-year 
assessment. However, six of the 100 PLCs that were originally identified had to be excluded. 
Three of these were newly listed companies in 2012 and the other three were undergoing 
privatization in the first quarter of 2013.2 These six companies were subsequently replaced 
with six other companies from the ranked list of companies. 
Overall Performance
Malaysia appears to have the highest number of default responses compared with the other 
ASEAN members.3 These can be found in the Rights of Shareholders (8 of 26 items) and 
Equitable Treatment of Shareholders (7 of 17 items) categories of the Scorecard. Figure 8 
shows the overall performance of the 100 assessed companies and the distribution of their total 
composite scores. The average composite score for Malaysia is 62.3 points; eight companies 
scored less than 50 points and one company achieved a composite score of more than 90 points.
2 The three newly listed companies were Felda Global Ventures Holdings, SapuraKencana Petroleum, and Gas Malaysia, 
and the three companies undergoing privatization in the first quarter of 2013 were KFC Holdings, QSR Brands, and 
Tradewinds.
3 Default response items are practices currently mandated by laws, regulations, or listing rules in a country. A company is 
assumed to have adopted the practices unless there is evidence to the contrary.
Figure 7 Recent Corporate Governance Journey in Malaysia
Corporate
Blueprint 2011
Governance
Towards Excellence in
Corporate Governance
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One of the aims of this initiative is to raise the standards of corporate governance in ASEAN 
PLCs. This, in effect, creates a race to the top. In such a competition, it would be helpful to 
know who the leaders of the race are so that the rest could be challenged and motivated. 
The results of the assessment in the second year revealed that there are indeed exemplary 
companies in each of the sections of the Scorecard. The exemplary companies are those that 
have scored in the 80th percentile or higher. These companies serve as motivation to other 
companies in the race to the top. 
Figure 9 Exemplary Publicly Listed Companies in Malaysia
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Figure 8 Overall Performance of Assessed Companies in Malaysia
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The results also show that 6 of the top 20 companies are government-linked companies.4 This, 
coupled with the fact that a number of government-linked companies are leaders in corporate 
governance, augurs well in the context of the Government of Malaysia’s initiative to transform 
these companies.
A major area for improvement observed in this year’s assessment is the prevalence of companies 
adhering only to the minimum requirements of the laws, rules, and regulations. In addition, the 
use of boilerplate disclosure is evident. Companies that can break away from these practices 
and demonstrate a strong commitment to high levels of transparency will be able to differentiate 
themselves from other companies. Companies should identify “low-hanging fruit” (for example, 
the various items in the Rights of Shareholders category) that could be implemented without 
much additional investment.
Part A: Rights of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
Of the 26 items in this category, 8 are default response items as there are prevailing laws, rules, 
and regulations for dealing with these items. The assessment revealed two notable observations. 
First, almost all of the companies appear to have substantial or major institutional investors 
other than the controlling shareholder(s) as shareholders. This type of shareholder is believed 
to be capable of playing the leading role in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. 
Second, all of the assessed companies are able to execute timely (within 24 hours) disclosure 
of the outcome of the AGM.
The main areas for improvement observed in relation to this category pertain to the lack of 
disclosure of policies, processes, and insights on the conduct of AGMs or to the absence of 
evidence of effective conduct of AGMs. In addition, many companies do not appear to have a 
policy to encourage the participation of institutional investors in AGMs. 
In relation to the timely payment of dividends, almost none of the companies adopt the 
recommended best practice of paying within 30 days after the declaration or approval of the 
dividend. While the Scorecard recommends that the companies seek shareholders’ approval 
for the remuneration of directors, it is common practice for Malaysian companies to define 
remuneration as directors’ fees only, without including other elements of the remuneration 
package (for example, bonuses, options, and fringe benefits).
4 Government-linked companies are the equivalent of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
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Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
In this category, 7 of the 17 items are default response items. Other than the default items, three 
practices that are prevalent in all Malaysian PLCs that were assessed and that are considered 
strengths are shown in Figure 11.
The areas for improvement by Malaysian companies include providing details in the notices of 
AGMs on the profiles of directors seeking election or reelection, and on the dividend policy and 
final dividend (if any). A few companies also give financial assistance to entities other than wholly 
owned subsidiaries. This practice of financial assistance should not be encouraged because 
wealth could be expropriated from minority shareholders to benefit controlling shareholders.
Figure 10 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Rights of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Substantial or major institutional investors other than the controlling 
shareholder(s), who can take the lead in protecting the rights of minority 
shareholders
•	 Timely disclosure of annual general meeting (AGM) results
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Nondisclosure of AGM policies and procedures
•	 No evidence of effective conduct of AGMs
•	 No policy to encourage institutional investors to participate in AGMs
•	 Late payment of dividends
•	 No shareholder approval of remuneration package for directors
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Figure 11 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 No bundling of resolutions in the annual general meeting (AGM)
•	 Availability of AGM materials in English
•	 Declaration that related-party transactions are fair and at arm’s length
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Lack of information in AGM notices about directors seeking election or reelection
•	 Lack of information in AGM notices about dividend policy and the final dividend
•	 Financial assistance to entities other than wholly owned subsidiaries, which 
could lead to expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders to benefit 
controlling shareholders
Part C: Role of Stakeholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
This category examines a company’s role in safeguarding the interests of the broader 
stakeholders, including customers, employees, and the society at large. All of the companies 
provide separate corporate social responsibility or sustainability disclosures of varying depth 
and breadth, either in the annual report, or in a stand-alone report, or both. Most companies 
disclose their policies on employees’ health and safety, and training and development. Many 
companies also provide alternative or multiple channels for stakeholders to raise concerns or 
lodge complaints and grievances.
Companies’ disclosure of aspects of policies and practices that deal with customers’ health and 
safety, supplier selection, anticorruption efforts, and whistle-blowing is a key area for improvement. 
In addition, companies should report relevant measures implemented for employees’ health and 
safety, and training and development.
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StrengthS
•	 Corporate social responsibility or sustainability disclosure in the annual report 
or a stand-alone report, or in both
•	 Disclosure of policies on employees’ health and safety, and training and 
development
•	 Provision of stakeholder channels for raising concerns or lodging complaints 
and grievances
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Lack of disclosure of policies and practices dealing with customers’ health and 
safety, supplier selection, anticorruption efforts, and whistle-blowing
•	 Poor reporting of measures taken for employees’ health and safety, as well as 
their training and development
Figure 12 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Role of Stakeholders
Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
This part of the Scorecard assesses a company’s level of transparency in relation to the disclosure 
of relevant information. The top companies were found to be strong in several aspects. All 
of them disclose the identity of the beneficial owners of substantial or major shareholders. 
Further, nearly all of the top companies disclose the direct and indirect shareholdings of major 
or substantial shareholders and directors, respectively. None of the top companies has failed to 
disclose the amount of audit and non-audit (if applicable) fees. A significant majority disclose 
the relevant details of RPTs and contact details for investor relations. 
In terms of possible areas for improvement, none of the PLCs assessed disclose the shareholdings 
(direct and indirect) and share dealings of senior management. In addition, only a few release 
the audited annual financial statements in less than 90 days from the financial year-end. Many 
companies do not fully use the capabilities of the internet for reporting purposes. For example, 
only a few companies disclose their constitution documents (articles or memorandums of 
association). Another area for improvement is the quality of the annual report content. 
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Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
This category has the largest number of items for assessment. It deals with various issues 
pertaining to the responsibilities of the board. All of the PLCs that were assessed disclose the 
board’s duties and responsibilities. Many of these companies also disclose the types of decisions 
requiring board approval. Nearly all companies have boards with between 5 and 12 directors. 
None have a board size that is too small, but a few have more than 12 directors on their board. 
Although almost all of the companies have different individuals holding the positions of chair 
of the board and chief executive officer, there are chairs who are not independent directors. 
In relation to directors’ remuneration, very few of the PLCs that were assessed award share 
options, performance shares, or bonuses to independent directors. 
Many PLCs were also found to have vested in the audit committee the responsibility for 
(i) making recommendations on the appointment, reappointment, or removal of the external 
auditor; and (ii) approving the appointment or removal of the head of internal audit. Disclosure 
by companies of internal control procedures and risk management systems in place appears 
to be the norm.
Figure 13 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Disclosure and Transparency
StrengthS
•	 Disclosure of the identity of the beneficial owners and substantial or major 
shareholders
•	 Disclosure of the direct and indirect shareholdings of major or substantial 
shareholders and directors
•	 Disclosure of audit and non-audit fees
•	 Disclosure of relevant details of related-party transactions and contact details 
for investor relations
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Nondisclosure of the shareholdings and share dealings of senior management
•	 Late release of audited financial statements
•	 Insufficient use of the internet for company reporting
•	 Insufficiently informative annual reports
•	 Lack of disclosure of key risks (other than financial risks), nonfinancial 
performance indicators, dividend policy, whistle-blowing policy, remuneration 
of individual directors and the chief executive officer, and training or continuing 
education programs attended by each director
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Regarding areas for improvement in this category, many PLCs do not disclose details of their 
code of ethics, including the content and processes for dealing with the implementation and 
monitoring of the code. A number of companies need to strengthen several aspects of the 
board, including the structure, process, independence, diversity, and appraisal of individual 
directors; the board as a whole; and board committees. Only a few companies have established 
board charters.
Except for the audit committee, which is a mandatory requirement, very few PLCs have 
instituted the relevant terms of reference and the workings of the nominating committee or 
the remuneration committee, if such committees have been established. In matters related to 
remuneration, companies normally do not (i) disclose the details of remuneration of executive 
directors and the chief executive officer, and the fee structure for nonexecutive directors, or 
(ii) adopt the practice of having either the shareholders or the board approve the remuneration 
of executive directors and senior executives.
Figure 14 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Responsibilities of the Board
StrengthS
•	 Disclosure of the duties and responsibilities of the board
•	 Disclosure of the types of decisions requiring board approval
•	 Board size of 5 to 12 directors
•	 Separate positions of chair and chief executive officer (although some chairs 
are not independent directors)
•	 Existence of an audit committee responsible for recommending the 
appointment, reappointment, or removal of the external auditor, and approving 
the appointment or removal of the head of internal audit
•	 Disclosure of internal control procedures and risk management systems
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Nondisclosure of code of ethics, including the related implementation and 
monitoring procedures
•	 Weak board structure, process, independence, diversity, and evaluation
•	 Nondisclosure of remuneration of individual directors and the chief 
executive officer
•	 No shareholder or board approval of executive directors’ and senior executives’ 
remuneration
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Bonus and Penalty
A few of the PLCs assessed demonstrate exemplary practices (Figure 15). 
The Penalty section of the Scorecard reflects items that are considered poor corporate 
governance practices. Very few companies practice poor corporate governance. However, there 
have been cases of pyramiding or crossholding; and a few companies, besides having one or 
more independent directors serving more than 9 years, have also failed to obtain shareholders’ 
approval for the retention of these independent directors.
Figure 15 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in the Bonus and Penalty Area
StrengthS
•	 Extended notice period (at least 28 days) for the annual general meeting
•	 Appointment of at least one female independent director
•	 Disclosure of comments by the board of directors (or the audit committee) on 
the adequacy of the company’s system of internal controls
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Cases of pyramiding or crossholding
•	 Independent directors serving more than 9 years, without shareholders’ 
approval of their retention
Conclusion and Recommendations
Although the assessment was limited to the top 100 PLCs, the performance of Malaysian 
companies, in terms of conformity to recommended corporate governance principles and 
practices, is commendable and at the same time presents opportunities for more improvement. 
Many, if not most, of the improvements could be addressed by the companies and their boards 
of directors. The pressing challenge is to encourage companies to improve further. This could be 
supported by introducing mechanisms or other initiatives to provide incentives to, reward, and 
recognize exemplary companies.
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Table 3 Corporate Governance: Top 50 Publicly Listed Companies – Malaysia
No. Publicly Listed Company Name No. Publicly Listed Company Name
 1 AirAsia 26 Malayan Banking
 2 Alliance Financial Group 27 Malaysia Airport Holdings
 3 AMMB Holdings 28 Malaysia Building Society
 4 Amway (M) Holdings 29 Malaysia Marine and Heavy Engineering
 5 Axiata Group 30 Malaysian Airline System
 6 BIMB Holdings 31 Malaysian Resources
 7 Boustead Holdings 32 Maxis
 8 British American Tobacco (Malaysia) 33 Media Prima
 9 Bumi Armada 34 MSM Malaysia Holdings
10 Bursa Malaysia 35 Nestle (Malaysia) 
11 Carlsberg Brewery Malaysia 36 Petronas Chemicals Group
12 CIMB Group Holdings 37 Petronas Dagangan
13 DiGi.Com 38 Public Bank
14 DRB-HICOM 39 RHB Capital
15 Fraser & Neave Holdings 40 Shell Refining Company (Federation of Malaya)
16 Gamuda 41 Sime Darby
17 Guinness Anchor 42 Star Publications (Malaysia) 
18 Hong Leong Bank 43 Sunway
19 IJM Corporation 44 Telekom Malaysia
20 IJM Land 45 Tenaga Nasional
21 IJM Plantations 46 Time Dotcom
22 Jaya Tiasa Holdings 47 Top Glove Corporation
23 KLCC Property Holdings 48 UEM Land Holdings
24 Kulim (Malaysia) 49 UMW Holdings
25 LPI Capital 50 United Plantations
Note: The publicly listed companies are arranged alphabetically.
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PHILIPPINES
Background
The Philippines officially launched its participation in the ASEAN Corporate Governance 
Scorecard on 11 September 2012. Orientation sessions on the Scorecard were held for 
evaluators and compliance officers to prepare both stakeholders for the new challenges ahead. 
The assessment involved selecting and validating the top 100 publicly listed companies (PLCs), 
based on market capitalization, and submitting their scores to the ASEAN Capital Markets 
Forum (ACMF). 
Overall Analysis
The average corporate governance score of Philippine PLCs is 48.9%. This is essentially a “trial 
score” resulting from the application of the Scorecard questionnaire to Philippine PLCs without 
much opportunity for intense education in the content of the Scorecard. Engagements with the 
PLCs are ongoing.
Among the five corporate governance categories, Philippine PLCs score highest in Equitable 
Treatment of Shareholders (71.4%), followed by Rights of Shareholders (56.0%), and Disclosure 
and Transparency (54.3%).
The categories in which Philippine PLCs score below 50% are Role of Stakeholders (28.0%) 
and Responsibilities of the Board (40.9%).
Figure 16 Scores in the Various Corporate Governance Categories
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Part A: Rights of Shareholders
Strengths and Areas for Improvement 
The Rights of Shareholders category aims to assess how a company recognizes all 
shareholders’ rights in conducting its business. Shareholders should be able to exercise their 
ownership rights—have access to and knowledge of issues that affect the corporation as a 
whole; receive dividends; participate in the annual general meeting (AGM); elect directors; 
subscribe to new securities offerings; buy, sell, or transfer assets of the company; and inspect 
the records and books of the company. A well-governed company must recognize and respect 
shareholders’ rights. 
Figure 17 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Rights of Shareholders
Average: 56.0%
StrengthS
•	 Shareholders can participate in amending the company’s articles of 
incorporation.
•	 Shareholders are allowed to participate in the transfer of all or substantially 
all assets, effectively resulting in the sale of the company.
•	 Shareholders are allowed to elect directors individually.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 The minutes of the most recent annual general meetings (AGMs) do not record 
questions and answers.
•	 There is a lack of policies to encourage shareholders, including institutional 
shareholders, to attend the AGM.
•	 There is insufficient disclosure of the attendance of the board at the AGM.
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Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement 
Equitable Treatment of Shareholders ensures fair treatment of controlling and minority 
shareholders. AGMs, for example, should facilitate the participation of all shareholders without 
undue complexity. Shareholders should be protected from possible tunneling actions by 
controlling shareholders, acting either directly or indirectly through the use of material nonpublic 
information and related-party transactions (RPTs).
Figure 18 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
Average: 71.4%
StrengthS
•	 Annual general meeting notices remain in the English language.
•	 Companies disclose having a policy requiring board members (directors and 
commissioners) to abstain from participating in board discussions of matters 
where they have a conflict of interest.
•	 Companies have policies that either forbid the granting of loans to directors 
and commissioners or ensure that such transactions are conducted at arm’s 
length and at market rates.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Directors and commissioners are to report their dealings in company shares 
within 3 business days, instead of the 5 business days required under 
Philippine law.
•	 The annual general meeting notice does not explain the dividend policy.
•	 Voting rights attached to each class of shares ought to be published if the 
company has more than one class of shares.
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StrengthS
•	 An increasing number of Philippine publicly listed companies (PLCs) now 
recognize the need to report, as part of their governance compliance program, 
on their long-term sustainability by including specific references to care 
for employees, service to customers, respect for rights of creditors, and 
contribution to the overall environment. This is a change: previously, references 
to these sustainability issues were excluded from their governance reporting.
•	 More Philippine PLCs have signed the integrity pledge and now include their 
anticorruption policies in their annual report.
•	 Philippine PLCs that are part of Philippine Business for Social Progress include 
their corporate social responsibility programs in their annual report.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Most companies fail to provide contact details via the company’s website or 
annual report for stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers, and the general 
public) to use to voice their concerns and complaints about possible violations 
of their rights.
•	 Data on training and development programs for employees are rarely published.
•	 There is no company policy or procedures to protect an employee or other 
person who reveals illegal or unethical behavior.
•	 There are no company procedures for dealing with complaints by employees 
concerning illegal (including corrupt) or unethical behavior.
•	 Data relating to the health, safety, and welfare of employees are not published.
Figure 19 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Role of Stakeholders
Average: 28.0%
Part C: Role of Stakeholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
Companies should act as responsible citizens of society. While a company operates on a 
for-profit business model, it should also keep the well-being of its stakeholders in mind. This 
includes taking care of its employees, going the extra mile in serving customers, and even 
contributing to community projects. Philippine companies score the lowest in this category.
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Figure 20 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Disclosure and Transparency
Average: 54.3%
StrengthS
•	 Publicly listed companies (PLCs) are able to faithfully disclose financial 
performance indicators in the annual report.
•	 PLCs are also able to provide up-to-date information about their business 
operations on their websites.
•	 The majority of PLCs disclose details of the parent or holding company, 
subsidiaries, associates, joint ventures, and special-purpose enterprises.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 PLCs seldom give details of their whistle-blower policies in their annual reports.
•	 Training and continuing education programs for directors of the company 
are usually not indicated in the annual report even if Philippine law requires 
training for company directors.
•	 Audited annual reports are usually not disclosed within 60 days from the 
financial year-end.
Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement 
Companies should disclose material corporate information in a timely and cost-effective manner. 
RPTs, firm ownership structure, financial information, and other information about company 
performance are all significant items to disclose. An independent assessment from an external 
auditor about the financial health of the company is also an important part of disclosure and 
transparency practices. 
Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
This category examines whether the board operates within an effective corporate governance 
framework. The directors must exercise their duties and obligations. Basic board responsibilities 
include creating and reviewing the company charter with the company’s vision and mission, and 
even hiring and firing the company’s chief executive.
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Figure 21 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Responsibilities of the Board
Average: 40.9%
StrengthS
•	 Publicly listed companies (PLCs) take having an audit committee seriously and, 
along with that, having an independent director as chair of the committee.
•	 PLCs do not neglect to compose a nomination committee in the board.
•	 All the directors or commissioners are subject to reelection at least once every 
3 years.
•	 Most corporate secretaries have legal or accountancy training.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 PLC chairs are usually not independent directors.
•	 PLCs do not disclose whether nonexecutive directors meet at least once a year 
without any executive directors present.
•	 Remuneration committees usually do not comprise a majority of the 
independent directors.
•	 Most often, PLCs do not disclose their succession plans for the chief executive 
officer, managing director, or president, and key management.
•	 PLCs seldom disclose how many times the remuneration committee meets 
during the year.
Bonus and Penalty 
Bonus items indicate best practices among companies. They include “preferred” practices 
such as a secure electronic voting system at the AGM to facilitate voting even in absentia, 
and a policy requiring directors, officers, and employees to disclose deals in company shares 
1 business day in advance. A bonus point is awarded for having a female independent director 
on the board. 
Penalty items are company actions and decisions that indicate poor governance. Some examples 
are the additional, unannounced items introduced into the agenda of the AGM; proven violations 
of laws concerning stakeholders; and revisions in the financial statements for reasons other than 
changes in accounting practices. 
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Figure 22 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in the Bonus and Penalty Area
StrengthS
•	 Publicly listed companies (PLCs) usually release their notice of annual general 
meeting (including a detailed agenda and explanatory circulars) at least 28 days 
before the date of the meeting.
•	 Annual reports also contain a statement from the board of directors or the 
audit committee highlighting the adequacy of the PLC’s internal controls and 
risk management systems.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 PLCs fail to provide justifications and obtain shareholders’ approval for retaining 
independent directors beyond 9 years.
•	 Some PLCs have violated Philippine laws pertaining to labor and employment, 
consumer protection, insolvency, commercial operations, competition, and 
environmental issues.
•	 Some PLCs face sanctions by regulators for failure to make announcements 
within the requisite time period for material events.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The trial scores for Philippine PLCs are the result of initial attempts to use the Scorecard. 
The Scorecard calls for an ASEAN peer review process. 
The trial scores gathered enable a comparison only of scores of Philippine PLCs. They cannot 
be compared with the scores of listed companies from other participating ASEAN economies 
or the scores of Philippine PLCs based on the old corporate governance compliance scorecard 
used in the Philippines, through the Institute of Corporate Directors (ICD), for almost a decade. 
To work toward much greater convergence with other ASEAN economies using the Scorecard, 
it is recommended that the following steps be undertaken. 
An intensive and extensive education and information campaign, preferably in partnership with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), on 
the use and application of the Scorecard should be implemented. This was done between 
February and April of 2013 and will continue throughout 2013. While doing so, the ICD should 
be ready to provide the concerned PLCs with their trial scores using the Scorecard and specific 
guidelines on what they need to do to improve their scores significantly.
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From May 2013 to the end of June 2013, the ICD will undertake a second trial initiative, by 
applying the Scorecard to company websites, company annual reports, and Annual Corporate 
Governance Report presented to the SEC and the PSE. The reference year will be 2012. This will 
enable the Philippines to catch up with other ASEAN economies that have already applied the 
Scorecard. The results of this second trial initiative will be used by the ICD to give recognition 
to companies with high scores. The recognition ceremony will take place in July 2013. 
Immediately after the July ceremony, a second intensive and extensive information and 
education campaign will be launched to align PLC disclosure practices more fully with the 
standards set in the Scorecard. Philippine PLCs will be given further instructions on how to 
improve their practices, including their disclosure format, wording, and other public information 
practices, which should be more readily accessible and investor friendly. 
Since the ASEAN scoring process can be undertaken anytime and relies mainly (although not 
exclusively) on company websites and company annual reports, the ICD should undertake a 
third trial initiative in November and December 2013. This would provide companies with a 
third trial score indicating the extent to which they may improve their scores, mainly by aligning 
their corporate governance and related disclosure practices with the standards and expectations 
set in the Scorecard. 
2014 should be the last year of the intensive and extensive information and education campaign 
designed to assist Philippine PLCs in complying with the corporate governance rules and 
regulations set by the SEC and the PSE. This is because 2015 will be the first year that the 
ASEAN community will be fully established. 
The 2015 scoring should be undertaken with much fuller convergence with the scoring 
undertaken in other participating ASEAN economies. The results for Philippine companies 
should be made directly comparable with the results for PLCs from other ASEAN economies. 
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Table 4 Corporate Governance: Top 50 Publicly Listed Companies – Philippines
No. Publicly Listed Company Name No. Publicly Listed Company Name
 1 Aboitiz Equity Ventures 26 Manila Electric Company
 2 Aboitiz Power Corporation 27 Manila Water
 3 ABS CBN Corporation 28 Metro Pacific Investments Corporation
 4 Alaska Milk Corporation 29 Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company
 5 Atok Big Wedge Company 30 Nickel Asia Corporation
 6 Ayala Corporation 31 Petron Corporation
 7 Ayala Land 32 Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
 8 Bank of the Philippine Islands 33 Philippine National Bank
 9 BDO Unibank 34 Philippine Savings Bank
10 Cebu Holdings 35 Philippine Stock Exchange
11 China Banking Corporation 36 RFM Corporation
12 COL Financial Group 37 Rizal Commercial Banking 
13 DMCI Holdings 38 Robinsons Land Corporation
14 EEI Corporation 39 San Miguel Brewery
15 Energy Development Corporation 40 San Miguel Corporation
16 Euro-Med Laboratories Philippines 41 San Miguel Properties
17 Filinvest Development Corporation 42 San Miguel Purefoods Company
18 First Gen Corporation 43 Security Bank Corporation 
19 First Philippine Holdings Corporation 44 Semirara Mining Corporation
20 Globe Telecom 45 SM Development Corporation
21 Holcim Philippines 46 SM Investments Corporation
22 International Container Terminal Services 47 SM Prime Holdings
23 JG Summit Holdings 48 Union Bank of the Philippines
24 Leisure & Resorts World Corporation 49 Universal Robina Corporation
25 Lopez Holdings Corporation 50 Vista Land & Lifescapes
Note: The publicly listed companies are arranged alphabetically.
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SINGAPORE
Corporate Governance Framework
The regulatory framework of corporate governance for publicly listed companies (PLCs) 
in Singapore comprises a number of sources of corporate governance rules, principles, and 
recommended practices, administered by several regulatory bodies. The primary sources are the:
•	 Companies Act of 1967 (and subsequent amendments),
•	 Securities and Futures Act of 2001 (and subsequent amendments),
•	 Listing Requirements (Rulebook), and
•	 Singapore Code of Corporate Governance of 2001 (and subsequent revisions).
The primary regulatory bodies involved are the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and the Singapore Exchange.
Most of the principles and recommended practices for good corporate governance for PLCs are 
in the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, which operates on a “comply or explain” basis.
The Singapore Code of Corporate Governance was most recently revised in May 2012, and a 
number of major changes in corporate governance requirements were introduced into the listing 
rules by the Singapore Exchange in September 2011. A committee reviewing the Companies 
Act has also submitted its recommendations to the Ministry of Finance, and most of its 
recommendations have been accepted.
Overall Analysis
The average overall score received by the largest 100 Singapore PLCs (by market capitalization) 
selected for the assessment is 56.1. Six companies received a score of more than 75 points. 
The minimum score received is 37.4, while the maximum score is 81.4. Thirty-one percent of 
the companies received a score of less than 50 points. For the 50 highest-ranked PLCs, the 
average score is 64.1.
Singapore PLCs scored best in the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, with an average score 
of 78%, and worst in Role of Stakeholders, with an average score of 37%. The relatively 
low scores for Role of Stakeholders reflect the fact that Singapore has historically adopted a 
“shareholder model” of corporate governance. It is only recently that regulators have started to 
encourage companies to pay more attention to other stakeholders and to sustainability reporting; 
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for example, through the recent revisions made in the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 
by the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the introduction of a guide to sustainability reporting 
by the Singapore Exchange. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of scores for the 100 PLCs for each part of the Scorecard.
Table 5 Distribution of Scores for the Assessed Publicly Listed Companies in Singapore
Item
Right of 
Shareholders 
Equitable 
Treatment of 
Shareholders 
Role of 
Stakeholders 
Disclosure 
and 
Transparency 
Responsibilities 
of the Board 
Level 1 
Score
Mean  5.1 11.7  3.8 14.1 21.8  56.4
Median  5.0 11.7  3.3 14.2 21.3  56.2
Minimum  3.8  9.4  0.0  8.8 12.2  41.8
Maximum  9.6 14.1  9.5 18.9 31.9  75.3
% Weighting 10.0 15.0 10.0 25.0 40.0 100.0
Part A: Rights of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The Singapore PLCs have generally done well in giving shareholders the right to approve the 
total remuneration of nonexecutive directors in accordance with the Singapore Companies 
Act. Most of them disclose the individual resolutions that were passed when they disclose 
the outcome of the annual general meeting (AGM), and the results of the AGM are generally 
announced by the next working day. Some PLCs also release the notice of AGM (with detailed 
agendas and explanatory circulars) at least 28 days before the date of the meeting, well beyond 
the minimum period of 14 days prescribed by the Companies Act and Singapore Exchange 
listing rules for meetings that do not include special resolutions or require special notice. 
Shareholders, especially those based overseas, are thus better able to participate effectively 
in these meetings. 
However, few PLCs disclose detailed minutes, which record questions raised by shareholders 
and answers provided by the board and management at the AGM. The failure to disclose detailed 
minutes has also led companies to score poorly in a number of areas that are generally covered 
in such minutes, such as whether they declared the voting and vote tabulation procedures 
before proceeding with the meeting, whether shareholders had an opportunity to ask questions, 
and whether and to what extent directors (especially the board chair and the audit committee 
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chair) and the chief executive officer (CEO) attended the meeting. PLCs also generally do not 
provide the rationale and explanation for each agenda item that requires shareholders’ approval, 
to allow shareholders to make an informed decision. There should be better transparency as well 
in the disclosure of a detailed breakdown of approving, dissenting, and abstaining votes for each 
resolution, and the use of an independent party to count and validate the votes. Currently, PLCs 
generally do not allow the use of secure electronic voting in absentia at the general meetings of 
shareholders, i.e., they require a proxy to be present at the general meeting.
Some PLCs have a pyramid ownership structure or cross-shareholdings that enable major 
shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their beneficial ownership in the 
company.
Figure 23 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Rights of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Shareholders allowed to approve remuneration of nonexecutive directors.
•	 Individual resolutions disclosed when annual general meeting (AGM) outcome 
is announced.
•	 Outcome of AGMs disclosed by the next working day.
•	 Notice of AGM and supporting documents published at least 28 days before 
the meeting.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Disclosure of detailed minutes of the AGM
•	 Disclosure of rationale and explanations for each agenda item in the AGM
•	 Disclosure of breakdown of approving, dissenting, and abstaining votes for 
each resolution
•	 Disclosure of whether an independent party was used to count and validate 
the votes
•	 Use of secure electronic voting in absentia at AGM
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Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
Currently, PLCs are not permitted to have more than one class of ordinary shares, and each 
ordinary share must have one vote. This ensures that all ordinary shareholders are treated 
equitably. Most PLCs disclose the voting rights attached to their shares. They also generally do 
not bundle their resolutions: each resolution deals with only one item. Notices of AGMs and 
circulars are in English, and contain details such as the name of the auditors to be appointed 
or reappointed and the amount of final dividend to be approved by shareholders, and the 
necessary documents for appointing a proxy are easily available. 
However, few PLCs provide an explanation of their dividend policy—something which the revised 
Singapore Code of Corporate Governance now recommends. Although Singapore has strict rules 
governing related-party (interested-person) transactions (RPTs), and the law requires directors 
to disclose their interests in transactions and to abstain from voting in order to avoid conflict 
of interest, few PLCs disclose that they have a policy that requires directors to follow a higher 
standard of conduct and to abstain from participating in board discussions of transactions where 
they have a conflict of interest. It is also rare for PLCs to have a policy requiring directors and key 
officers to notify the board or its delegate at least 1 day before they deal in the company shares.
Figure 24 Strengths and Areas of Improvement in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Disclosure of voting rights attached to shares
•	 Separate resolution for each item on the agenda
•	 Publication of notice of annual general meeting and circulars in English
•	 Disclosure in the notice of annual general meeting of information, such as the 
name of the auditor to be appointed or reappointed and the amount of final 
dividends to be approved
•	 Easy accessibility of proxy forms
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Explanation of dividend policy
•	 Disclosure of policy requiring directors to abstain from participating in board 
discussions of transactions in which they have a conflict of interest
•	 Policy requiring directors and key officers to notify the board or a delegate 
1 day before dealing in company shares
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Part C: Role of Stakeholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
Although Singapore PLCs are starting to report on sustainability and discuss practices relating 
to other stakeholders, there is room for improvement in this area.
Most PLCs disclose how creditors’ rights are safeguarded and have procedures allowing 
employees to raise concerns about illegal or unethical behavior. However, very few PLCs 
disclose policies and activities relating to customers’ health and safety, supplier and contractor 
selection, and anticorruption programs and procedures. Further, few PLCs provide contact 
details to enable stakeholders (such as customers, suppliers, and the general public) to raise 
concerns about violations of their rights. PLCs also rarely disclose data relating to the health, 
safety, welfare, and training and development of their employees. 
Some companies have failed to comply with certain laws relating to the protection of stakeholders 
(e.g., employment, consumer, or competition laws) or have been sanctioned by regulators for 
failure to make announcements within the requisite time period for material events, thereby 
failing to keep stakeholders sufficiently informed in a timely manner.
Figure 25 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Role of Stakeholders
StrengthS
•	 Disclosure of how creditors’ rights are safeguarded
•	 Existence of policies allowing employees to raise concerns about illegal or 
unethical behavior
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Sustainability reporting
•	 Disclosure of contact details to enable stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers, 
and the general public) to raise concerns
•	 Disclosure of data relating to health, safety, welfare, and training and 
development of employees
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Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
Most PLCs have a transparent ownership structure through good disclosure of the identity 
of substantial shareholders; direct and deemed ownership of substantial shareholders and 
directors; and details of the parent or holding company, subsidiaries, associates, joint ventures, 
and special-purpose entities. Good disclosure has also been made by most PLCs in relation 
to key financial performance indicators, the number of meetings of the board of directors and 
attendance at the meetings, and audit and non-audit fees. All the PLCs assessed practice 
quarterly reporting and release the audited annual report within 120 days of the financial 
year-end because of applicable listing rules or legal requirements. Nearly all the PLCs have 
websites and these websites generally disclose up-to-date information about the business 
operations, current and prior years’ financial statements and reports, and notice of annual and 
extraordinary general meetings; and allow the public to download annual reports.
However, annual reports of Singapore PLCs generally do not disclose information about 
corporate objectives, nonfinancial performance indicators, dividend policy, details of the 
whistle-blower policy, training and continuing education programs attended by each director, 
the direct and deemed shareholdings of senior members of management who are not directors 
or substantial shareholders, and the exact remuneration of the CEO and individual board 
members. Nor do they provide confirmation that the company has fully complied with the 
Code of Corporate Governance (or, where there is noncompliance, identify and explain the 
noncompliance). The disclosure of relationship for parties involved in RPTs and trading in 
the company’s shares by insiders (beyond directors and substantial shareholders) is also 
often lacking. PLCs rarely disclose the identity of advisers or consultants to the remuneration 
committee appointed by the board, and they rarely state whether these advisers or consultants 
are deemed independent or have declared any conflicts of interest.
Few PLCs go beyond the regulatory requirements in relation to the timeliness of release of 
the audited annual report, for example, by releasing them within 60 or 90 days. Few PLC 
websites provide information about the group corporate structure and the company’s constitutive 
documents, such as the memorandum and articles of association.
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Figure 26 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Disclosure and Transparency
StrengthS
•	 Disclosure of information in the annual report:
 – ownership and group corporate structure of the company
 – financial performance indicators
 – board meetings and attendance of individual directors
 – audit and non-audit fees
•	 Release of audited annual report within 120 days from financial year-end
•	 Disclosure of information on company website:
 – business operations
 – current and prior years’ financial statements and reports
 – notice of annual general meeting or extraordinary general meeting
 – downloadable annual report
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Disclosure of information in the annual report:
 – corporate objectives and nonfinancial performance indicators
 – whistle-blower policy
 – training programs attended by each director
 – exact remuneration of the chief executive officer and individual board members
 – confirmation of compliance with the corporate governance code
 – relationship of parties involved in related-party transactions
 – trading in company’s shares by insiders (other than directors and substantial 
shareholders)
•	 Release of audited annual report within 60 or 90 days from financial year-end
•	 Disclosure of information on the company website:
 – group corporate structure
 – constitutive documents such as articles and memorandums of association
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Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
Most companies disclose the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors, the types of 
decisions requiring board approval, and the roles and responsibilities of the board chair. Boards 
of directors generally consist of a reasonable number of directors (between 5 and 12) and 
have at least one nonexecutive director with prior working experience in the major industry 
of the company. In almost all the PLCs that were assessed, at least one-third of the board 
comprises independent directors, and in some of these companies independent directors 
constitute the majority. Boards are generally supported by a company secretary in discharging 
their responsibilities. Directors generally go up for reelection once every 3 years, but there are 
some PLCs where the CEO or managing director is not required to do so.
Most PLCs have established audit, nominating, and remuneration committees with an 
independent chair and a majority of independent members, and disclose the terms of 
reference and details of the number of meetings and attendance at these meetings. Most 
audit committees have at least one independent director with accounting expertise (defined 
as accounting qualification or experience) and meet at least four times during the year. Most 
of the PLCs assessed have also disclosed the existence of a separate internal audit function. 
New Singapore Exchange rules that first took effect in the financial year ending on 31 December 
2011 now require a statement from the board of directors, with the concurrence of the audit 
committee, commenting on the adequacy of the company’s internal controls in addressing key 
risks. Some PLCs have already included such a statement in their annual report.
Some PLCs have taken steps to further enhance their structure and processes by having at least 
one female independent director, having totally independent committees, compiling a board 
profile as part of their board appointment process, and using an external party periodically to 
facilitate the board assessment. 
However, few PLCs have disclosed that they have a corporate governance policy or board 
charter; most rely on the Code of Corporate Governance to guide their corporate governance 
practices. Companies generally do not disclose details of their code of ethics or conduct; the 
extent of compliance with the code that is required of all directors, senior management, and 
employees; or the manner in which the code is implemented and compliance is monitored. Few 
PLCs disclose how regularly they review and approve the vision and mission of the company. 
Most PLCs have not addressed the key issues that have surfaced with regard to independent 
directors, including the independence of directors from both management and substantial 
shareholders, the term limit of 9 years for independent directors, and the limit on the number of 
directorships in PLCs that a director can hold at the same time. These issues are now covered 
in the revised Code of Corporate Governance, and more companies are expected to address 
these issues in the future. It is quite common for companies to have independent directors 
SIN
G
A
P
O
R
E
Country Reports and Assessments 49
who have served for more than 9 years. There is no existing practice among Singapore PLCs 
of providing justification and seeking shareholders’ approval to retain such directors beyond 
9 years. Companies rarely have a diversity policy for their board of directors. Most chairs are 
not independent directors. 
Disclosures relating to the conduct of board meetings are generally poor. Most companies do 
not disclose (i) that they schedule board meetings well ahead of time (before or at the beginning 
of the year); (ii) that they provide board meeting papers well ahead of the board meeting 
(at least 5 business days before the meeting); and (iii) that the nonexecutive directors meet 
separately at least once a year without management present. They also do not disclose their 
quorum requirements.
Disclosure relating to other key board practices and responsibilities, including the director 
appointment process, succession planning for key management, performance assessment of 
the CEO, and the process of director and committee appraisal, is generally lacking.
There is also room for improvement in the disclosure of remuneration policies for the CEO and 
executive directors, and in the approval of the remuneration of executive directors and senior 
executives by the entire board or by a wholly independent remuneration committee (especially 
as the remuneration of these key officers is currently not subject to approval by shareholders).
Few companies disclose that the appointment or removal of the internal auditor requires the 
approval of the audit committee. Most companies do not disclose that the board of directors 
has conducted a review of the company’s material controls (including operational, financial, and 
compliance controls) and risk management systems. Disclosure of how key risks (other than 
financial risks) are managed is also generally lacking.
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Figure 27 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Responsibilities of the Board
StrengthS
•	 Disclosure of roles and responsibilities of the board and the board chair
•	 Boards with at least one-third independent members
•	 Establishment of key committees with independent chairs and independent 
members composing the majority
•	 Disclosure of terms of reference of committees
•	 Disclosure of committee meetings and attendance by individual members
•	 Establishment of audit committee with at least one independent director who 
has accounting expertise
•	 Existence of separate internal audit function
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Company corporate governance policy or board charter
•	 Code of ethics or conduct 
•	 Review and approval of vision and mission of the company
•	 Diversity policy
•	 Independent board chair
•	 Term limits for independent directors
•	 Directorship limits for directors
•	 Independent directors to be independent from both management and 
substantial shareholders
•	 Conduct of board meetings
•	 Disclosure of processes such as director appointments, succession of key 
management, performance assessment of the chief executive officer, and 
board and committee assessment 
•	 Disclosure of remuneration policies and approval
•	 Approval of audit committee for appointment and removal of internal auditor
•	 Review of internal controls and risk management system by the board of directors
•	 Disclosure of management of key risks (other than financial risks)
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Conclusion and Recommendations
The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard is developed largely based on the OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance. It differs from the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance, which 
has a stronger focus on board matters and equitable treatment of shareholders. The average 
score of just over 56 for the 100 largest companies by market capitalization is a result of the 
difference in focus where listed companies in Singapore have been working to comply with 
the Code of Corporate Governance. Six companies have nevertheless scored above 75. With 
a shifting focus by the regulatory bodies on stakeholders and sustainability reporting through 
recent revisions to the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance and the introduction of a 
Sustainability Reporting Guide, Singapore companies should improve their performance in these 
areas which are of interest to different stakeholders. This will help these companies, most of 
which have a market capitalization of over S$1 billion, to seek and attract global investors.
However, as the above discussion indicates, there is room for improvement in all areas. Here 
are some suggested key areas for improvement:
•	 Communication with shareholders. Companies should improve their communication 
with shareholders around general meetings. They should (i) state more clearly the rationale 
of agenda items requiring shareholders’ approval; (ii) send out notices and circulars in a 
timely manner, clearly explaining procedures for meetings before they start; (iii) provide 
more detailed minutes of general meetings; (iv) ensure that directors (especially the 
board and committee chairs) and key members of the management team are present 
at general meetings; (v) ensure that an independent party is involved in counting and 
validating votes; and (vi) disclose fully the voting results for each resolution after the 
general meeting. Given the importance placed by many shareholders on dividend policy, 
companies should disclose their dividend policy and explain the rationale of the policy.
Companies need to consider in particular how to leverage technology to communicate 
better with global investors, possibly through webcasting of general meetings, electronic 
communication and dissemination of documents, and electronic voting in absentia.
•	 Directors’ and insiders’ interests. Companies should adopt more stringent standards 
in relation to directors’ interest in transactions and dealing in shares by directors and 
key officers. This is necessary because they are in a position of conflict or may be in 
possession of material nonpublic information. Directors should be required to abstain 
from discussions on transactions in which they have a conflict of interest, and even to 
recuse themselves. Directors and key officers should also be required to notify the board 
or its delegate before trading in the shares of the company. Such a measure is beyond 
the current rules, which require directors and substantial shareholders to disclose share 
trades only after the trades are made.
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•	 Stakeholders’ issues. Companies need to go beyond the current practice of generic 
discussions of corporate social responsibility and sustainability, and adopt robust policies, 
undertake activities, and report specific data relevant to different stakeholders, including 
creditors, employees, customers, suppliers, and the community at large. They also need 
to pay more attention to anticorruption programs and avenues for stakeholders to lodge 
complaints about violations of their rights.
•	 Disclosure and transparency. There is room for improvement in disclosure, both in 
annual reports and on websites. The disclosure covers a variety of information relating to 
the business and corporate governance of the company, including information about share 
trades by insiders and RPTs. Companies can use their websites better to communicate 
corporate governance information, such as the company’s memorandum and articles of 
association, board charter or corporate governance policy, code of ethics, and terms of 
reference of committees.
•	 Board responsibilities. Companies should develop a corporate governance policy or 
board charter to guide their implementation of corporate governance. The board should 
set the tone at the top by ensuring that the code of ethics or conduct is sufficiently 
comprehensive and applies to directors, management, and employees, and that the 
company has in place procedures for implementing and monitoring compliance with 
the code.
Companies need to pay more attention to the independence of directors, including 
threats to independence caused by relationships with major shareholders and long 
tenure, and to the ability of directors to commit sufficient time to the discharge of their 
responsibilities. They will need to consider issues of limits on the tenure of independent 
directors and the number of directorships held by directors.
Disclosure relating to the conduct of board meetings and to key practices and 
responsibilities of the board can also be improved. In addition, many companies 
can improve the disclosure of the remuneration of the CEO and individual directors, 
remuneration policies for executive directors and senior management, the board’s 
oversight of internal controls and risk management, and the management of key risks.
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Table 6 Corporate Governance: Top 50 Publicly Listed Companies – Singapore
No. Publicly Listed Company Name No. Publicly Listed Company Name
 1 Ara Asset Management 26 Olam International 
 2 Asia Pacific Breweries 27 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation
 3 Biosensors International Group 28 Singapore Airport Terminal Services 
 4 CapitaLand 29 Sembcorp Industries 
 5 CapitaMalls Asia 30 Sembcorp Marine 
 6 City Developments 31 SIA Engineering
 7 ComfortDelGro Corporation 32 Singapore Airlines 
 8 COSCO Corporation (Singapore) 33 Singapore Exchange 
 9 DBS Group Holdings 34 Singapore Post 
10 EZRA Holdings 35 Singapore Press Holdings 
11 First Resources 36 Singapore Tech Engineering 
12 Fraser and Neave 37 Singapore Telecommunications
13 Gallant Venture 38 SMRT Corporation 
14 Global Logistic Properties 39 Sound Global 
15 Great Eastern Holdings 40 Sri Trang Agro-Industry
16 Hi-P International 41 StarHub 
17 Hong Leong Asia 42 STATS ChipPac 
18 Hong Leong Finance 43 STX OSV Holdings 
19 Jardine Cycle & Carriage 44 Tiger Airways Holdings 
20 Keppel Corporation 45 United Engineers
21 Keppel Land 46 United Overseas Bank 
22 Keppel Telecommunications & Transportation 47 UOL Group 
23 Liongold Corporation 48 WBL Corporation 
24 M1 49 Wilmar International 
25 Neptune Orient Lines 50 Ying Li International Real Estate 
Note: The publicly listed companies are arranged alphabetically.
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THAILAND
Corporate Governance Framework
The corporate governance framework for publicly listed companies (PLCs) in Thailand has 
evolved around the following primary pieces of legislation: 
•	 the Public Limited Company Act of 1992,
•	 the Securities and Exchange Act of 2010, and
•	 the Civil and Commercial Code of 2011.
These laws have laid a strong foundation, institutional setting, supervisory framework, and 
enforcement rules for the Thai capital market. The secondary level of regulatory requirements 
governing corporate governance practices in Thailand consists of
•	 listing rules by the Stock Exchange of Thailand, and
•	 regulatory notifications by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The tertiary level of corporate governance compliance operates on the “comply or explain” basis. 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand initially issued the 15 Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
in 2002 and then amended these into the Principles of Good Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in 2006. The principles have now been revised and introduced to the Thai listed 
companies and will take effect in January 2015 to further ensure sound corporate governance 
practices in Thailand. 
Overall Analysis
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Corporate Governance Scorecard 2012 
reviewed the corporate governance practices of 100 Thai listed companies, using the assessment 
criteria embodied in 219 questions. The average corporate governance score in 2012 was 67.7%. 
Among the five categories benchmarked against the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Principles on Corporate Governance, Thai listed companies scored 
highest in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders. Rights of Shareholders showed the second-
highest score, while Disclosure and Transparency and Responsibilities of the Board came next. 
The average score was lowest in Role of Stakeholders. Improvement in Role of Stakeholders
and Responsibilities of the Board must be further advocated for Thai listed companies.
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Part A: Rights of Shareholders
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The Rights of Shareholders principle aims to assess whether the company recognizes the 
shareholders’ rights in its business affairs. According to the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance, shareholders should generally be able to exercise their ownership rights, such as 
rights on issues that affect the corporation as a whole; the right to receive dividends; the right 
to participate in the annual general meeting (AGM); the right to elect the directors; the right to 
subscribe to new securities offerings; the right to buy, sell, or transfer assets of the corporation; 
and the right to inspect the records and books of the corporation. A well-governed company 
must protect shareholders’ rights. 
The majority of Thai PLCs exhibit good governance practices in allowing shareholders to 
participate in decision making and to exercise their rights at the AGM. Only a few governance 
areas need improvement.
Figure 28 shows the strengths and areas for improvement in Rights of Shareholders. Most Thai 
PLCs allow their shareholders to elect directors individually, and disclose the outcome and the 
voting results, including approving, dissenting, and abstaining votes for each agenda item, by 
the next working day. The notice of call to a shareholders’ meeting provides the rationale and 
explanation for each agenda item. In addition, most Thai listed companies hold the AGM at an 
easy-to-reach location. These practices reflect well on Thai listed companies, as they clearly 
demonstrate that they are designed to protect the rights of shareholders. 
However, the responses to some survey questions show room for improvement. First, an 
independent party should be appointed to count the votes at the AGM. Second, Thai listed 
companies should encourage share ownership of greater than 5% by institutional investors. 
Lastly, the chair of the board should attend the AGM regularly.
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Figure 28 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Rights of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Allow shareholders to elect directors individually.
•	 Disclose the outcome of the annual general meeting (AGM) by the next 
working day.
•	 Disclose the voting results including approving, dissenting, and abstaining votes 
for each agenda term.
•	 Provide the rationale and explanation for each agenda item in the notice of AGM.
•	 Organize the AGM in an easy-to-reach location.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Need to encourage the chair of the board to attend the AGM.
•	 Have not yet appointed an independent party to count votes at the AGM.
•	 Encourage share ownership of greater than 5% by institutional investors.
Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement 
The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders principle strives to ensure fair treatment of 
shareholders, both controlling and noncontrolling. The AGM process, for example, should 
enable all shareholders to participate in the meeting without undue complexity. In addition, 
outside shareholders should be protected from possible tunneling actions by or for controlling 
shareholders acting directly or indirectly through the use of material nonpublic information and 
related-party transactions (RPTs).
Figure 29 summarizes the important observations in the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
category. Most Thai listed companies issue the notice of shareholders’ meeting with full details 
of the auditor and dividend agenda, and without bundling of several items into the same agenda. 
Most Thai listed companies also have a policy on insider trading.
Regarding areas for improvement, only some Thai listed companies disclose information in the 
notice of AGM on the date of first appointment and directorship in other listed companies of 
individuals seeking director election or reelection. Also, most Thai listed companies have had 
RPTs that can be considered as financial assistance to a nonsubsidiary company.
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Figure 29 Strengths and Areas of Improvement in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Do not bundle several items into the same agenda in the notice of call to 
annual general meeting (AGM).
•	 Provide details of auditor and dividend in the notice of call to AGM.
•	 Have a policy on insider trading.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Disclose information about date of first appointment and directorship in other 
listed companies of individuals seeking director election or reelection in the 
notice of call to AGM.
•	 Have related-party transactions that can be considered as financial assistance.
Part C: Role of Stakeholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
Stakeholders are affected by the decisions and actions that the firms make. The companies 
should therefore behave ethically and in a socially responsible manner. To earn premium corporate 
citizenship, companies must integrate the concept of corporate responsibility into their business 
model and activities. Corporations should pursue the interests of the various stakeholders, not 
just those of shareholders, and thereby enhance the well-being of all stakeholders. 
Figure 30 presents the strengths and areas for improvement in the Role of Stakeholders
category. Most Thai listed companies have set a policy on the treatment of stakeholders and a 
separate corporate responsibility report or section in the annual report.
However, the majority of Thai listed companies still have much to do to improve their governance 
practices, especially the treatment of stakeholders, to meet international standards. They still 
fall short in the disclosure of practices relating to the health, safety, and welfare of employees 
and to the staff training and development program. Also, only some Thai listed companies have 
procedures for dealing with complaints from employees about illegal or unethical behavior, and 
a policy or procedure for protecting whistle-blowers from retaliation.
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Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement 
Companies should disclose material corporate information in a timely and cost-effective manner 
through a variety of channels to reach all interested and relevant parties in time. RPTs, firm 
ownership structure, financial information, and other information about company performance 
are all significant items to disclose. An independent assessment from an external auditor about 
the financial health of the company is also an important part of the disclosure and transparency 
practices. 
Figure 31 presents the strengths and areas for improvement in the category of Disclosure 
and Transparency. Most Thai listed companies disclose the policy and full details of RPTs, 
as well as audit and nonaudit fees in the annual report. In addition, most Thai listed companies 
include statements of affirmation from their board members in the annual financial statement. 
The majority of Thai listed companies disclose company information and contact details of 
investor relations on their website. 
On the other hand, there are further improvements to be made. For example, Thai PLCs should
•	 disclose the direct and indirect shareholdings of the board and senior management;
•	 disclose trading by directors and senior management in the company’s shares;
•	 disclose corporate objectives and nonfinancial performance indicators in the annual report; 
•	 disclose in the annual report information about the directors’ date of first appointment, 
directorship in other listed companies, and training and education obtained in the most 
recent financial year.
Figure 30 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Role of Stakeholders
StrengthS
•	 Have a policy on the treatment of stakeholders.
•	 Have a separate corporate responsibility report or section in the annual report.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Publish information relating to the health, safety, and welfare of employees.
•	 Publish information on the training and development program for employees.
•	 Have procedures for dealing with complaints by employees concerning illegal 
or unethical behavior.
•	 Have a policy or procedure to protect a person who reveals illegal or unethical 
behavior from retaliation.
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Figure 31 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Disclosure and Transparency
StrengthS
•	 Quality of website
•	 Disclosure of policy and details of related-party transactions
•	 Disclosure of audit and nonaudit fees
•	 Affirmation of the annual financial statement by the board of directors
•	 Disclosure of contact details of investor relations
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Disclosure of direct and indirect shareholdings of board and senior management
•	 Disclosure of trading in the company shares by directors and senior management
•	 Disclosure of corporate objectives and nonfinancial performance indicators in 
the annual report
•	 Disclosure in the annual report of directors’ date of first appointment, 
directorship in other listed companies, and training and education obtained in 
the most recent financial year
Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement 
The Responsibilities of the Board category examines whether there is an effective corporate 
governance framework for the board members to act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, 
with due diligence and care, and in the best interests of the company and the shareholders. 
The board of directors must exercise care and loyalty in overseeing the business organization 
and protecting the shareholders’ assets. Basic board responsibilities include (i) creating and 
reviewing a statement of vision and mission that articulates the organization’s goals and primary 
constituents, (ii) participating in overall planning and assisting in implementing and monitoring 
the plan, (iii) securing adequate financial resources for the organization to fulfill its mission, 
(iv) assisting in developing the annual budget and ensuring that proper financial controls are in 
place, (v) articulating prerequisites for director candidates, (vi) orienting new board members 
and evaluating their performance periodically and comprehensively, (vii) adhering to legal norms 
and high ethical standards, (viii) undertaking a careful search to find the most qualified chief 
executive, and (ix) supporting and evaluating the chief executive.
Figure 32 shows the strong practices and areas for improvement in the Responsibilities of the 
Board category. On the positive side, the majority of Thai listed companies have their own 
corporate governance policy, code of ethics, and clear roles and responsibilities of the board. In 
addition, the internal control analysis suggests that most Thai listed companies have an internal 
TH
A
IL
A
N
D
ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard60
control and risk management system in place. With regard to the separation of monitoring and 
management, most Thai listed companies indicate that the chair of the board is an independent 
director and not the chief executive officer (CEO). Also, the majority of Thai listed companies 
schedule board meetings before or at the start of the year and hold such meetings at least six 
times a year. 
Despite these good governance practices, there are areas for improvement. Only some Thai 
PLCs disclose the type of decisions requiring board approval, the board diversity policy, the 
role and responsibilities of the chair, the policy limiting to five the number of board seats that 
a director may hold at the same time in listed companies, and the policy limiting the term of 
independent directors to 9 years. Under the duty of care of the board of directors, only some 
Thai listed companies report an average board meeting attendance by individual directors of 
greater than 75% of all board meetings. In addition, only some boards conduct an evaluation 
of the board, individual directors, and board committees, and disclose the criteria and process 
in the annual report. Also, the board of directors should review the vision and mission at least 
once every 5 years. 
Figure 32 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Responsibilities of the Board
StrengthS
•	 Clear roles and responsibilities of the board
•	 Disclosure of the company’s corporate governance policy and code of conduct
•	 Separate roles of the chair and the chief executive officer
•	 Chair is an independent director
•	 Good structure of board committees
•	 Scheduling board meetings before or at the beginning of the year
•	 Board meetings are held at least six times per year
•	 Board establishment and review of the internal control and risk management system
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Disclosure of types of decisions requiring board approval
•	 Disclosure of board diversity policy
•	 Disclosure of the role and responsibilities of the chair
•	 Disclosure of the term limit of 9 years for independent directors
•	 Disclosure of the limit of five seats in publicly listed companies that a director may 
hold simultaneously
•	 Board review and approval of the vision and mission at least once every 5 years
•	 Attendance of each director at 75% or more of all board meetings during the year
•	 Evaluation of the board, individual directors, and board committees, and disclosure 
of the evaluation criteria and process
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Figure 33 Strengths and Areas of Improvement in the Bonus and Penalty Area
StrengthS
•	 Release the notice of the annual general meeting at least 28 days before the 
date of the meeting
•	 Include in the annual report a statement from the board of directors or audit 
committee commenting on the adequacy of the company’s internal controls 
and risk management system
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Need to disclose the date of first appointment of each independent director
•	 Need to provide justification and obtain shareholder approval for retaining 
independent director beyond 9 years
Bonus and Penalty
The Bonus questions recognize and reward companies with internationally accepted governance 
practices. In contrast, a penalty is recorded for companies with governance practices or violations 
that are beyond the pale of the good corporate governance paradigm. 
Figure 33 shows the strengths and areas for improvement in the Bonus and Penalty area. The 
majority of Thai listed companies give their shareholders enough time to prepare for the AGM 
by releasing the notice of meeting at least 28 days before the date of the meeting. In addition, 
the audit committees of most Thai firms state in their report that the internal controls and risk 
management systems are adequate for ensuring the integrity of the reporting systems and are 
disclosed in the annual report. 
The independence of any director who has served on the board beyond 9 years from the 
date of first appointment should be subject to particularly rigorous review. In the review, the 
board should take into account the need to refresh the board membership. The board should 
also explain why any such director should be considered independent. Most Thai companies 
do not disclose the date of first appointment of each independent director and fail to provide 
justification and obtain shareholders’ approval for the retention of independent directors beyond 
9 years.
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Recommendations and Conclusion 
The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 2012 provides a clear picture of the most recent 
corporate governance practices of Thai PLCs. Thai PLCs do well in the Rights of Shareholders
and Equitable Treatment of Shareholders categories. Specifically, the notice of call to AGM and 
the AGM minutes are of high quality and have complete details. However, several governance 
areas in the Role of Stakeholders and Responsibilities of the Board categories need further 
attention to meet international standards.
Another important finding from the Scorecard is that a company should not only set effective 
corporate governance policy, but also apply consistent procedures in disclosing its existing 
corporate governance policy and practices. With a corporate governance policy in place, the 
company should effectively disclose how it practices that policy. Outside shareholders, including 
institutional investors, rely on publicly available information and therefore place significant 
emphasis on the disclosure of the company’s corporate governance policy and practices. The 
company may prepare a manual for any corporate officers to consistently follow in disclosing 
the relevant corporate governance information to the public. Moreover, the company should 
make its corporate information available in English to facilitate investment decision making by 
foreign investors. The company should also regularly update the corporate information on its 
website. In due course, Thai PLCs will be ready for the corporate governance assessment at 
the international level—the Scorecard in 2015. The Thai Institute of Directors is determined to 
assist Thai PLCs in meeting high governance standards. 
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Table 7 Corporate Governance: Top 50 Publicly Listed Companies – Thailand
No. Publicly Listed Company Name No. Publicly Listed Company Name
 1 Advanced Info Service 26 Land and Houses
 2 Airports of Thailand 27 MCOT 
 3 Amata Corporation 28 Minor International
 4 Asian Property Development 29 Oishi Group
 5 Bangkok Bank 30 Precious Shipping
 6 Bangkok Expressway 31 Pruksa Real Estate
 7 Bank of Ayudhya 32 PTT Exploration and Production
 8 Banpu 33 PTT Global Chemical
 9 Big C Supercenter 34 PTT
10 Central Pattana 35 Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding
11 CIMB Thai Bank 36 Robinson Department Store
12 Eastern Water Resources Development 
and Management
37 S&P Syndicate
13 Electricity Generating 38 SC Asset Corporation 
14 GFPT 39 Shin Corporation
15 GMM Grammy 40 Somboon Advance Technology
16 HANA Microelectronics 41 Thai Oil
17 Hemaraj Land and Development 42 Thai President Foods
18 Home Product Center 43 Thanachart Capital
19 I.C.C. International 44 Bangchak Petroleum
20 Indorama Ventures 45 Siam Cement
21 IRPC 46 Siam Commercial Bank
22 Jasmine International 47 TISCO Financial Group
23 Kasikornbank 48 TMB Bank
24 Kiatnakin Bank 49 Total Access Communication
25 Krung Thai Bank 50 True Corporation
Note: The publicly listed companies are arranged alphabetically.
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VIET NAM
Corporate Governance Framework
In Viet Nam, the main laws and regulations affecting corporate governance are the Law on 
Enterprises of 2005, the Law on Securities of 2006, the Model Charter of 2007, Ho Chi Minh 
Stock Exchange and Hanoi Stock Exchange Listing Requirements, and corporate governance 
regulations. 
The corporate governance regulations that are most applicable to publicly listed companies 
(PLCs) are the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies (supplementing the Law of 
Enterprises and the Law of Securities), the Modal Charter, and disclosure requirements.
The issuance of the Code of Corporate Governance in March 2007 under Decision 12/2007/
QDBTC first introduced corporate governance concepts and principles to PLCs in Viet Nam. 
It was revised in 2012 under Circular 121/2012/TT-BTC in July 2012. Board responsibilities 
and disclosure and transparency requirements were the main focus of the revision. The revised 
code, which took effect on 17 September 2012, applies not only to PLCs but also to all other 
public companies in the country.
The Sample
The sample of PLCs in Viet Nam was selected from two stock markets, the Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange (HSX) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), on the basis of market capitalization. All 
of the companies chosen had to have documents, such as annual reports, available in English. 
The final sample for Viet Nam therefore comprised 39 PLCs with a total market capitalization of 
$23.58 billion, representing 65.5% of the total market capitalization of the two stock exchanges 
at the end of June 2012.
Overall Analysis 
According to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Corporate Governance 
Scorecard, corporate governance practices in Vietnamese PLCs fall below expectations. All 
stakeholders need to exert much more effort to raise these practices to international standards. 
Corporate governance performance requires improvement in all categories, with below-average 
scores in each category, as shown in Figure 34. Performance is weakest in Responsibilities of 
the Board (average score of 17.2%) and Role of Stakeholders (26.9%). The Responsibilities 
of the Board category has below-average maximum (30.4%) and minimum (7.5%) scores. 
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Although the maximum score in Role of Stakeholders is above average (61.9%), at least one 
company scored zero in this category. The next-weakest performance is in Disclosure and 
Transparency, an important category given that the assessment is based on information that is 
publicly available and accessible. A company may already practice good corporate governance, 
but if it does not disclose or mention its practices using public information media, including 
annual reports, company websites, and regulatory filings, the assessment can be impaired by 
the lack of data and information.
Figure 34 Scores of Publicly Listed Companies in the Various Corporate Governance Categories
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The second reason for the poor scores is the lack of investor communications in English. As the 
Scorecard is based on sources available to the typical international investor, the language used 
in public media must be English. Most investor communications of Vietnamese PLCs are in the 
Vietnamese language, and therefore they could not be used in the assessment. 
Detailed analyses in each Scorecard category show weak policies and practices in Vietnamese 
PLCs. Only strong commitment from individual directors, executives, and stakeholders, as well 
as the regulator, can help improve corporate governance.
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Part A: Rights of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The country’s corporate governance framework requires companies to respect the rights of 
shareholders, including the right to participate and vote in the annual general meeting (AGM), 
make fundamental decisions for the company, nominate and elect directors, approve major 
transactions, and receive a share of company profits.
To exercise their rights, investors need access to company information. Vietnamese PLCs are 
good at organizing AGMs in easy-to-reach locations. But the investor communications of most 
companies are in the local language; materials and documents in English are available only to a 
very limited extent. Foreign investors therefore find it very difficult to practice their rights. 
For most Vietnamese PLCs, the major problems occur in holding AGMs. Notices usually lack 
justifications for proposed resolutions and are sent out late. After the AGM, the resolutions are 
not disclosed promptly on the company’s website and in most cases are not comprehensive. 
AGM minutes are rarely available; if they are, the contents are often incomplete and give limited 
information about the attendance of board members and top executives in the AGM. Lastly, 
companies do not provide dividends on time.
Figure 35 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Rights of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Annual general meetings (AGMs) are held in easy-to-reach locations.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 AGM notices are not comprehensive and are sent out late.
•	 AGM notices lack explanations and information.
•	 AGM resolutions are not released promptly on company and exchange websites.
•	 AGM minutes are unavailable or not comprehensive, with limited information 
about the attendance of board members and key executives.
•	 Dividends are not paid on time.
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Part B: Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The corporate governance framework requires equitable treatment of all shareholders, 
including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redress of violations of their rights, and should be protected from potential 
violations, mainly from related-party transactions (RPTs) and insider trading. AGM processes 
and procedures should provide for the equitable treatment of all shareholders. 
In AGM notices, Vietnamese PLCs are good at presenting resolutions as single items and not as 
a bundle of several items. However, English is not widely used in the country and companies do 
not communicate in English with investors and other stakeholders. It is therefore very hard to 
ensure equitable treatment of foreign and local investors. Vietnamese firms are consequently at 
a disadvantage in the assessment, which is made from the standpoint of international investors 
and therefore requires documents in the English language. 
With regard to the protection of noncontrolling shareholders, companies fail to require directors 
dealing in the company’s shares to report those transactions within 3 business days. Companies 
are also weak at reviewing and approving RPTs and ensuring that they are conducted fairly. 
Companies generally do not have a policy to prevent conflicts of interest that would require 
board members to abstain from decisions that serve their private interests. 
In nominations, companies are weak at providing comprehensive profiles of directors seeking 
election, and at identifying auditors seeking appointment or reappointment. Also, dividend policy 
is hardly ever explained.
Figure 36 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
StrengthS
•	 Annual general meeting resolutions are presented as single items and not as a 
bundle of several items.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Annual general meeting notices are not translated into English and published on 
the same date as the version in the local language.
•	 Directors dealing in company shares are not required to report these dealings 
within 3 business days.
•	 Policies on the review, approval, and conduct of related-party transactions are weak.
•	 Companies generally have weak mechanisms for preventing conflicts of interest in 
board decisions. Profiles of directors seeking election are not comprehensive.
•	 Auditors seeking appointment or reappointment are not clearly identified.
•	 Dividend policy is not explained.
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Part C: Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The corporate governance framework requires recognition of the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements, and cooperation between companies and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and financially sound and sustainable enterprises.
Performance in the category of corporate governance is among the weakest for Vietnamese PLCs. 
Corporate social responsibility is still a new concept to Vietnamese PLCs. Vietnamese PLCs are 
nonetheless good at interacting with communities through programs such as human capital 
building, community outreach, and economic value strengthening. However, they need to exert 
significant efforts to improve policies and practices for addressing customer health and safety, 
selecting suppliers, safeguarding creditor rights, and implementing anticorruption programs.
With respect to stakeholder protection, companies do not have specific contact details that 
stakeholders can use when they need to voice concerns and lodge complaints about violations 
of their rights. Regarding employee participation, companies lack performance-improvement 
mechanisms, such as employee training and development programs; programs for employee 
health, safety, and welfare; and a reward and compensation policy for long-term, deserving 
performers. Companies also have weak policies and procedures for allowing employees to voice 
complaints about illegal and unethical behavior, and most have no policies and procedures for 
protecting whistle-blowers.
Figure 37 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Role of Stakeholders
StrengthS
•	 Companies generally have policies and practices for effectively interacting with 
communities.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Companies lack policies and practices for addressing customer health and 
safety, selecting suppliers, safeguarding creditor rights, and implementing 
anticorruption programs.
•	 Companies generally do not give specific contact details for stakeholders to use 
when they need to voice concerns and complaints about violations of their rights.
•	 Mechanisms for improving employee participation are weak.
•	 Companies have weak policies and procedures for allowing employees to 
voice complaints about illegal and unethical behavior, and generally lack 
whistle-blower protection policies and procedures.
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Part D: Disclosure and Transparency 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The corporate governance framework requires timely and accurate disclosure of all material 
issues affecting the company, including its financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance. It shows not only how transparent the company is to its shareholders, but also 
allows shareholders to know how committed the company is to regulations and to its own rules 
and policies. Unfortunately, Vietnamese PLCs score low on average in this category. 
Vietnamese companies are good at disclosing the identity of major shareholders; details of 
subsidiaries, associates, joint ventures, and special-purpose enterprises or vehicles; and the 
nature and value of material RPTs. They are also good at presenting financial statements with 
board members or top executives attesting to their correctness and fairness.
Significant improvements need to be made in disclosure and transparency in annual reports of 
the company’s dividend and whistle-blowing policies, biographical details of directors, training 
and education program for directors, attendance at board meetings, and remuneration of the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and board members. Companies do not present a statement of full 
compliance with the Code of Corporate Governance, and fail to explain cases of noncompliance. 
The disclosure of policies for the review and approval of major RPTs and for audit and nonaudit 
fees is still considerably below standard, and the use of communication media, such as analyst 
briefings, media briefings and press conferences, and websites, is limited. Companies also do 
not release financial statements on time, and generally do not provide full contact details for the 
officer responsible for investor relations. 
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Figure 38 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Disclosure and Transparency
StrengthS
•	 Companies reveal the identity of major shareholders.
•	 Companies disclose details of subsidiaries, associates, joint ventures, and 
special-purpose enterprises or vehicles.
•	 Companies disclose financial performance indicators.
•	 Companies disclose the nature and value of material related-party transactions.
•	 Board members or top company executives affirm the correctness and fairness 
of financial statements.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Companies do not state the dividend policy and whistle-blower policy in their 
annual reports, and do not disclose the biographical details of directors, the 
training and education program for directors, attendance at board meetings, 
and the remuneration of the chief executive officer and board members.
•	 Companies generally do not present a statement of full compliance with the 
Code of Corporate Governance and do not explain cases of noncompliance.
•	 Companies do not disclose the policy for the review and approval of major 
related-party transactions.
•	 Disclosure of audit and nonaudit fees is very poor.
•	 The use of communication media, such as analyst briefings, press conferences, 
and media briefings, is limited.
•	 Financial statements are not released on time.
•	 Company websites have limited information regarding shareholding structure and 
other materials normally provided in briefings to analysts and media.
•	 Full contact details for the officer responsible for investor relations are not 
disclosed.
Part E: Responsibilities of the Board 
Strengths and Areas for Improvement
The corporate governance framework provides strategic guidance to the company, and ensures 
effective monitoring of management by the board and the accountability of the board to the 
company and the shareholders. If the board does not set and monitor corporate governance 
practices or, worse, if it is unaware of its duty to do so, overall governance will be very poor. 
Vietnamese PLCs score lowest in this category. 
Lack of transparency in director profiles, director activities and meetings, director appointments 
and functions, and director remuneration is among the most critical issues. Vietnamese PLCs are 
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good at keeping the size of the board within 5 to 11 members, with at least one nonexecutive 
director having prior work experience in the major industry of the company. However, various 
areas need further improvement to meet regional and international standards. Companies do 
not disclose clearly defined board responsibilities and board decisions. Boards of directors are 
deficient in performing their responsibility of setting up governance principles and codes of 
conduct for their companies, and of reviewing and approving the corporate vision and mission, 
as well as material control and risk management systems. Boards in Vietnamese PLCs are 
usually not independent from the management, do not have functional committees responsible 
for nomination and remuneration, and do not have a clear diversity policy. Board reports do not 
disclose the attendance of individual members at meetings. Company reports do not mention 
details about the orientation and training program for new and incumbent board members. 
Board and individual directors’ annual assessments and details of their remuneration are rarely 
mentioned. Few companies have a separate internal audit function. 
The supervisory board in Vietnamese PLCs is supposed to monitor both the board of directors 
and the management; however, it falls short of its designed effectiveness in monitoring and in 
the task of addressing corporate issues.
Figure 39 Strengths and Areas for Improvement in Responsibilities of the Board
StrengthS
•	 The board size is generally kept between 5 and 11 members.
•	 At least one nonexecutive director has prior working experience in the major 
industry in which the company operates.
AreAS for Improvement
•	 Board responsibilities and board decisions are unclearly defined.
•	 Companies are remiss in setting up a code of ethics and a corporate 
governance policy.
•	 Directors are deficient in performing the responsibility to review and approve 
the corporate vision and mission.
•	 Boards lack independence from the management, support from functional 
committees, and a clear diversity policy.
•	 Board meeting attendance and board decision making are not disclosed in 
board reports.
•	 The orientation program for new directors and director training are often not 
mentioned in board reports.
•	 Company reports generally do not mention board appraisal and remuneration.
•	 Most companies have no internal audit function.
•	 Directors do not review material control and risk management systems.
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Bonus and Penalty
The Bonus and Penalty area weighs heavy in the Scorecard. Even with good performance in 
other areas, if a company violates a standard covered in the Penalty area, it could lose up to 
10 points. The sampled firms received an average deduction of 1 point in this category. In the 
most serious case, the company received a deduction of 8 points.
With their limited information disclosure, Vietnamese firms are at a disadvantage in the Bonus
category. Bonus points come only from the early release of AGM notices and accompanying 
documents. 
Companies are most commonly penalized for a “qualified opinion” from independent auditors, 
for revisions in financial reports, and for violations of rules regarding trading in company shares 
by the company itself.
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The issuance of the updated corporate governance code in May 2012 was an encouraging 
development. It showed the strong commitment of regulators to improve corporate governance 
in the country and is expected to be a catalyst for improved corporate governance in Vietnamese 
PLCs. However, moving from the regulations to actual practice requires not only top–down 
enforcement, but also voluntary commitment by the companies, which must devote significant 
time and effort to the undertaking. Among the areas of enforcement focus, regulators must 
check the following closely:
•	 Preparation, announcement, and conduct of AGMs; provision of AGM documents to 
investors to facilitate their approval; and promptness with which resolutions are announced. 
AGM resolutions must be announced at an early date. Although they are not required by 
law to do so, PLCs should also release AGM minutes to the public to increase transparency.
•	 Equitable treatment of foreign and local investors. Companies must be encouraged to 
make investor resources available in English. This will allow Viet Nam to benefit from 
the integration of financial markets in the region.
•	 Equitable treatment of controlling and noncontrolling shareholders in RPTs. The 
disclosure of RPTs needs to be made mandatory, with requirements for full disclosure 
of information including name, relationship, value, and nature of the transaction; and 
mechanisms to prevent conflicts of interest.
•	 Anticorruption principles and creditors’ right to protection, along with better programs 
and policies to ensure employee health and safety.
•	 Transparency regarding the direct and indirect shareholdings of the company and 
the transactions of substantial shareholders and directors in the company’s shares. 
Transparency in this matter should be strictly enforced to avoid potential violations of 
shareholder rights.
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•	 Disclosure of board member profiles. Full disclosure must be encouraged, especially 
regarding directorships held in other companies. 
•	 Transparent reporting of board activities and board remuneration. 
•	 Stricter enforcement of the timely submission of financial statements. 
•	 Disclosure of board responsibilities and board decisions.
•	 Role of the supervisory board.
•	 Independence of the board. To facilitate compliance with the new corporate governance 
code and its stricter requirements for board independence, regulators should encourage 
the establishment of an institute that provides training in corporate governance to directors 
and corporate secretaries. Such an institute would create new pools of independent 
directors for PLCs and thereby improve independence among the PLCs.
The Scorecard results have shown that, although Vietnamese PLCs have made attempts to 
improve corporate governance, significant efforts are still needed to face the challenges and 
reap the benefits of the integration of the regional financial markets. Vietnamese PLCs must 
recognize the benefits of capital market integration, such as the availability of a larger pool of 
funds. The efforts should be voluntary and concerted, and should not proceed only from top–
down regulatory enforcement. Among the various governance categories, the most important 
ones to focus on are Disclosure and Transparency and Responsibilities of the Board.
Vietnamese PLCs must ensure that source documents are available both in Vietnamese and 
in English to promote the equitable treatment of domestic and foreign investors, and to make 
Viet Nam more attractive in the international financial markets. Transparency is especially 
important in the timely release of financial statements; the disclosure of the direct and indirect 
shareholdings of directors and major shareholders; the release of a comprehensive annual 
report that discloses dividend policy and whistle-blower policy, board members’ attendance at 
meetings and remuneration details, and RPT policy; and the independence of external auditors.
The board of directors needs to exercise stronger authority in providing strategic guidance to 
the company, monitoring the management, and ensuring the company’s accountability to its 
shareholders. Specifically, the board of directors should (i) have clearly stated responsibilities 
and decisions, (ii) regularly review and approve the vision and mission, (iii) formulate a code 
of conduct and a corporate governance policy, (iv) take steps to enhance their independence, 
(v) increase their functional effectiveness by setting up specialized board committees, (vi) organize 
continuous training and education programs for new and incumbent directors, (vii) perform 
the annual appraisal of individual board members and the whole board, (viii) oversee risk 
management systems, and (ix) set up and maintain an active internal audit function.
Enhancing the corporate governance of Vietnamese PLCs demands efforts from various parties—
the company itself, the regulator, the investors, and advocates. Long-term commitment, together 
with prompt action, is crucial to success.
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Table 8 Corporate Governance: Top 30 Publicly Listed Companies – Viet Nam
No. Publicly Listed Company Name No. Publicly Listed Company Name
 1 Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank 16 Kinh Do Group
 2 Bao Viet Securities 17 Masan Group
 3 Bao Viet Holdings 18 Minh Phu Seafood
 4 BIDV Insurance 19 Nam Bay Bay Investment
 5 Dry Cell & Storage Battery 20 PetroVietnam Drilling and Well Services
 6 FPT Corporation 21 PetroVietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals
 7 Gemadept Corporation 22 PetroVietnam Finance
 8 Hau Giang Pharmaceutical 23 PetroVietnam Insurance
 9 Ho Chi Minh City Securities 24 PetroVietnam Southern Gas
10 Hoa Binh Construction and Real Estate 25 Refrigeration Electrical Engineering
11 Hoa Phat Group 26 Saigon–Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank 
12 Hoa Sen Group 27 Saigon Securities
13 Hoang Anh Gia Lai Group 28 Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank
14 Joint Stock Commercial Bank for 
Foreign Trade of Vietnam
 29    Saigon General Service Corporation
 30    Tan Cang Logistics
15 Kinh Bac City Development 
Share Holding Corporation
Note: The publicly listed companies are arranged alphabetically.
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CONCLUSION AND ADB’S 
RECOMMENDATION4
The ASEAN corporate governance initiative is a showcase of successful collaboration between 
capital market regulators, domestic ranking bodies, independent corporate governance experts, 
and development partners. During the implementation of this initiative, several key decisions 
and critical factors contributed to its outcome, including this report. This section reviews some 
of these factors and offers some recommendations to those involved. 
The first critical factor in any regional initiative is a strong and effective anchor organization. 
Regional initiatives by their nature are consensus-building exercises. Building consensus across 
countries with different levels of economic and regulatory development, different types of legal 
architecture, and different corporate governance cultures requires participants to focus on the 
bigger picture of regional integration and needs a body to lead and coordinate these efforts. 
Some compromises may be necessary to get agreement, but the agreement should not be 
based on the lowest common denominator. For this initiative, the implementation plan for 
regional integration represents the bigger picture and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Capital Markets Forum serves as the anchor organization. 
Second , the corporate governance experts engaged should not only be technical experts, but 
must also enjoy the confidence of the regulators. Ideally, all participating countries should 
be represented during the development stage. This encourages a deliberative process that 
considers the unique characteristics of each country’s corporate governance legal architecture 
and culture. While there is a risk that having country representatives may result in a regional 
initiative that is designed with national interests in mind, this can be mitigated by identifying 
the regional objective of the initiative at the outset and keeping this objective as the main basis 
for decisions made during both the developmental and implementing stages. Where there are 
differences in views, an independent and internationally recognized reference point is required. 
International standards, such as the corporate governance principles of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, play that important role because they are recognized 
by the international community. The incorporation of such standards into the development of 
the Scorecard also increases the likelihood that international investors will accept the Scorecard 
results and ranking. Validation with the international corporate governance community through 
discussion and presentation in international events also increases the quality of the output. 
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During the final development stages and before the publicly listed companies (PLCs) are 
assessed, the private sector i.e., companies that will be the subject of the assessment, should 
be sufficiently engaged and the Scorecard should be adequately disclosed and distributed. 
Any scorecard creates expectations and, depending on the incentives for scoring well, has the 
potential to modify corporate governance practices both in substance and in disclosure. For 
the scoring and ranking to be representative of corporate governance standards in a particular 
country, the PLCs must be aware of the Scorecard’s requirements. For this initiative, several 
seminars, conferences, and workshops were held in participating countries to familiarize 
stakeholders with the Scorecard. However, PLCs should not use the Scorecard as a compliance 
document or a checklist of good corporate governance practices; rather, they should always 
be encouraged to go beyond its requirements. The Bonus and Penalty section encourages this 
approach. 
During the assessment stage, even after the experts have agreed on the content of the 
Scorecard and even when the questions are objective and require “yes” and “no” responses, 
differences of interpretation are unavoidable. To mitigate and minimize the differences, two 
steps are required: first, a detailed guidance note for the assessors, and second, a robust peer 
review process after the initial assessment. During the peer review, differences of opinion 
should be discussed and debated. Although decisions have to be made by the majority, they 
should be based on sound justification. 
Third, although development partners can play a catalytic role in supporting the initial phase 
of an initiative, no initiative can be sustainable if it is dependent on external resources. For the 
initiative to be sustainable, the local authorities or stakeholders need to be able to see the value 
of the initiative and must be willing to take it up, including its associated costs. This is why it 
is important for an initiative to be output oriented in the early years, so that its value can be 
demonstrated. It is also crucial that the initiative is financially sustainable and that there is an 
effective cost recovery method. 
For future implementation, four recommendations can be considered to keep the momentum 
of the initiative and take it to the next level. First, assessment using the Scorecard should 
be a continuous process. It will require several iterations before the Scorecard becomes self-
sustaining. An annual or biennial event where the results of the Scorecard are distributed and 
publicized can be hosted in collaboration with the private sector. Second, different countries 
should lead the initiative by rotation. This serves two purposes. First, the initiative benefits 
from different leadership, which provides its own value add. Each country gets the opportunity 
to influence the initiative as long as the process is consultative and inclusive of the other 
participating countries. Second, a rotation process reduces the perception that the initiative 
is dominated by one country and increases the chances that the initiative will be taken to the 
next level. 
Third, while assessment and ranking has its own value, especially given that good corporate 
governance practices increase shareholder value at least in the medium term, opportunities 
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for synergy with other regional capital market initiatives should also be explored. The 
interconnectedness of regional initiatives increases their sustainability, the sum being greater 
than the individual parts. For example, there is potential for the top-performing ASEAN corporate 
governance PLCs to be marketed along with the ASEAN Stars (top performing companies) during 
ASEAN Invest events. This would be consistent with the idea of using corporate governance to 
brand ASEAN as an asset class. 
Finally, the ASEAN Scorecard can also be a reference point for the development of national 
corporate governance frameworks. The recommendations implicit in the Scorecard should filter 
down to the review process of corporate governance codes and guidelines. This completes 
the cycle, as the initiative incorporates national perspectives, is then developed into a regional 
ASEAN product, and ends up guiding the development of national corporate governance. While 
it is unrealistic to expect a one-to-one correlation between a regional initiative and national 
frameworks, because recommendations suitable from a regional perspective, benchmarked 
against international standards mainly used to attract foreign investors may not be always 
appropriate for countries that are still developing their corporate governance framework, the 
spirit should be consistent and the two processes should move in the same direction. 
ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 
Country Reports and Assessments 2012–2013
Corporate governance principles provide guidance on how corporations should operate 
and can be useful to attract foreign investments. In the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), countries use national methodologies to assess corporate governance 
performance of publicly listed companies. The Asian Development Bank in partnership 
with the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum have jointly developed an ASEAN methodology of 
corporate governance assessment using a scorecard system that is based on international 
best practices and that encourages publicly listed companies to go beyond national 
legislation requirements. This inaugural report is a compilation of corporate governance 
assessments of publicly listed companies in six ASEAN countries using the Scorecard. 
The assessment is useful to improve corporate governance in the region collectively and 
to brand ASEAN as an asset class.
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